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WHEN CIRCUMSTANCES PROVIDE A
GUARANTEE OF GENUINENESS: PERMITTING





That fateful phrase was uttered by pilot Michael J. Smith at almost the same instant
that the space shuttle "Challenger" exploded before the eyes of the unsuspecting NASA
ground control crew, the families and friends of the astronauts invited to watch the
launch, and television viewers who had just witnessed another apparently successful
space launch. It was the last communication by a member of the crew, 2 and suggests that
at least one of the astronauts was aware of an impending disaster.' Evidence produced
by an investigation of the explosion appears to support the conclusion that the crew
survived the explosion in space only to find themselves trapped in the crew module as
it fell toward earth and its ultimate destination deep in the Atlantic Ocean. 4 While no
one knows how long the crew members remained conscious after the explosion, 5 three
of the four recovered emergency breathing packs had been activated, 6 suggesting a
t Copyright C 1987 Boston College Law School
* Assistant Professor of Law, Delaware Law School of Widner University, J.D. Villanova Uni-
versity School of Law. The author wishes to acknowledge the generous assistance of Regina lorii,
Bernadette Sullivan, and Virginia Whitehili.
1 Boffey, Challenger Crew Knew of Problem, Data Now Suggests, N.Y. Times, July 29, 1986, at 1,
cal. 6.
2 Id.
Rear Admiral Richard H. Truly, NASA's associate administrator for space flight, was quoted
as saying that the commander of the space craft, Francis R. Scobee, also may have been aware that
something had gone wrong. Id. at C9, col. 2,
4 Dr. Joseph P. Kerwin, the NASA official who lead the investigation of the Challenger disaster,
concluded that "the forces to which the crew were exposed during orbiter were probably not
sufficient to cause death or injury ... ."Id. at C9, col. 1. This finding contradicts NASA's preliminary
conclusion that the crew did riot survive the explosion. Id.
5 Id. at C9, col. 3. Dr. Kerwin suggested that the crew members lost consciousness after the
shuttle breakup because of a loss of pressure inside the crew module. Id. at C9, col. 1. The doctor
could not rule out the possibility, however, that they remained conscious as the space craft fell to
earth and plunged into the water. Id. at C9, col. 4. Dr. Kerwin also suggested that if a loss of
pressure occurred, the astronauts may have been conscious for only about 10 seconds after the
explosion and, thus, may have been unconscious upon impact with the ocean. Id. Furthermore, Dr,
Kerwin stated that the crew probably did not suffer any personal injuries from the explosion. Id.
at C9, col. 1.
Id. at C9, col. 3. Each member of the crew had a "personal egress air pack" attached to his
or her helmet which contained an emergency air supply. Id. These packs could only be activated
manually. Id. at C9, col. 4. The investigators ruled out the possibility that the impact with the water
jolted the packs into operation. Id. One of the activated packs belonged to pilot Smith. Id. at C9,
cols. 3-4. The investigation suggested that Smith could not have activated his own unit without
unstrapping himself, which he did not do. Id. at C9, col. 4. Because Smith was found strapped to
his seat, it is likely that another crew member activated his air pack. Id.
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possibly substantial period of consciousness. This evidence should figure prominently in
the lawsuit filed by Smith's family which, among other things, seeks damages for the
pilot's knowledge of his "impending doom." Such a disaster ordinarily will spur actions
by a decedent's dependents under a wrongful death statutes or by a decedent's estate
pursuant to a survival act° for damages which accrued at the time of the death."' Pain
and suffering" experienced by the decedent due to physical injury often comprise a
Boffey, Astronaut's Family Seeks $15 Million from NASA, N.Y. Times, July 16, 1986, at Al, col.
3.
The 1985 crash of a Japan Air Lines Boeing 747, in which 520 people were killed, provides
another example of a frightening pre-death ordeal. In that instance, the plane banked and lurched
for 30 minutes while the crew members worked desperately to keep it aloft. Throughout this period,
the passengers were aware of their peril, according to messages later found in the debris. One of
the messages written by a passenger indicated that after the explosion, smoke filtered into the cabin
and the plane began a sharp descent. This description was corroborated by Yumi Ochiai, one of
only four survivors, who also stated that she heard children screaming "Mommy" as the plane
began its last vertical plunge. N.Y. Post, Aug. 19, 1985, at 13, col. 2; What Went Wrong?, NEwswE,Ex,
Aug. 26, 1985, at 14.
Wrongful death actions are creatures of statutes, enacted in response to the harshness of the
common law which denied recovery to a tort victim if he or she were unfortunate enough to die.
A cause of action for wrongful death or survival, discussed at note 9, infra, is now recognized in
every American jurisdiction. 3 MINZER, DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 20.11 (1987),
The common law basis for denying recovery for wrongful death has been succinctly stated: "If
the victim of a tort himself for herself] died (from whatever cause) before he [or she] recovered in
tort, the victim's right of action also died." W. KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 125A (5th
ed. 1984) (footnote omitted). Lord Ellenborough stated: "[l]n a civil court the death of a human
being could not be complained of as an injury." Baker v. Bolton, I Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033
(1808).
Fortunately, this harshness has been altered by wrongful death statutes. Although the statutes
vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, some general elements are common to most. The executor
or administrator of the decedent's estate usually brings suit. Recovery is measured by the value of
the support, services, and contributions which the beneficiary could have expected to receive had
the victim lived. PROSSER & KEETON, supra, § 127, at 951. Moreover, a number of states expressly
provide for nominal or punitive damages in wrongful death cases. MINZER, supra, § 20.1112].
Damages for the survivors' grief, emotional distress, loss of society, or any other incidents of family
association, however, are not permitted in most jurisdictions. PROSSER & KEETON, supra, § 127, at
951.
9
 At common law, a tort victim could maintain an action against the tortfeasor for the damages
sustained as a result of the injury. If the victim died, however, the cause of action died with him or
her. Modern statutes in most states have altered this undesirable result by providing that the cause
of action survives the victim's death. The measure of damages is the loss sustained by the decedent
between the time of injury and the time of death, and the damages recoverable arc generally the
same as those recoverable in a personal injury action. M1NZ•R, supra note 8, at § 20.14. Thus, the
victim's estate may recover for the decedent's conscious pain and suffering between injury and
death, lost earnings between the time of injury and death, medical and funeral expenses, and
punitive damages. See generally id. §§ 21.10, 21.20, 21.30, 21.40. A minority of jurisdictions permit
recovery for future earnings. See id. 21.22.
t° See, e.g., Della Names F.A.A. in Crash Lawsuit, N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1985, al B 14, col. 1 (noting
wife of passenger killed in airport crash filed suit against airline); Joyce, $140 Million MGM Fire
Settlement, N.Y. Times, May I I , 1983, at D5, col. I (settlement paid to families of fire victims).
" "Pain and suffering" traditionally refers riot only to the physical pain resulting from the
injury, but also to the mental suffering experienced because of the physical pain. MINZER, supra
note 8, § 4.10. Some authorities include emotional injury unassociated with physical trauma within
the definition of pain and suffering. See Koskoff, The Nature of Pain and Suffering, 13 Trial 21, 22
( July 1977). Some courts have also lumped damages for mental disturbance not associated with
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significant portion of a personal injury claim. 12 Because recovery for pain and suffering
generally has been limited to situations in which the decedent was conscious, 19 plaintiffs
frequently find such damages unavailable where the decedent either died on impact or,
as apparently occurred in the Challenger accident, lost consciousness prior to sustaining
physical injury. Recovery in such instances often has been limited to economic loss and,
occasionally, the emotional trauma the survivors experienced."
Traditional legal analysis rejected the notion that the victim's mental tranquility
should be protected against intentional or negligent invasions. 15 A liberalization of this
attitude has since changed the focus of scholarly inquiry from whether emotional distress
is compensable at all' 9 to a determination of the extent of protection which it should
receive. 17 As a result, some courts have permitted recovery for the emotional distress
suffered by a victim upon his or her realization of the peril to which his or her personal
security has been exposed by the defendant's negligence. 18 Often called pre-impact
distress,' 9 this cause of action has allowed significant recovery for often fleeting seconds
of mental anguish. A plaintiff may, however, find the court reluctant to recognize pre-
impact distress, either because of the traditional concerns that limited recovery for
physical injury under this type of heading. See Shu-Tao Lin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 574 F.
Supp. 1407, 1416-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 742 F.2{1 45 (2d Cir. 1984) (allowing damages for pre-
impact emotional distress as "pain and suffering"); Malacynski v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 565 F.
Supp. 105, 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (same). For the purposes of clarity, this Article uses the term "pain
and suffering" to describe mental and physical damage due to physical injury. When mental
suffering exists apart from physical pain or injury the Article uses the terms, "emotional distress,"
"mental disturbance," "mental distress," or "mental anguish."
12 MINZER, supra note 8, at § 4.01. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 615 F. Supp. 391 (D. Mass.
1985) (finding reasonable $50,000 award to lobsterman's estate for pain and suffering when the
evidence showed he survived no longer than ten minutes in frigid waters); Reed v. Union John
Deere, 569 F. Supp. 371 (M.D. La. 1983) (finding reasonable $10,000 of a $418,000 verdict allocated
to pain and suffering sustained by decedent who lived not more than a few seconds after impact).
' 3 MINZER, supra note 8, at § 4.2431. The Iowa Supreme Court succinctly stated the basis for
this requirement: "[A}n unconscious person does not suffer pain." Hurtig v. Bjork, 258 Iowa 155,
160, 138 N.W.2d 62, 65 (1965). Other courts have denied recovery for pain and suffering in death
cases where the plaintiff' was unable to establish the decedent's post-injury consciousness. See, e.g.,
Nye v. Pennsylvania Dept of Transp., 331 Pa. Super. 209, 214, 480 A.2d 318, 321 (1984) (no
recovery for pain and suffering between the time or injury and death unless decedent was con-
scious); see also MINZER, supra note 8, at § 4.20; Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 323 F. Supp 865
(S.D. Tex. 1970) (no recovery for pain and suffering when decedent was rendered unconscious by
the injuries); Brooks v. United States, 273 F. Supp. 619 (D.S.C. 1967) (barring recovery for uncon-
scious pain and suffering).
1 ' See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text. In addition, some jurisdictions permit recovery
for the loss of society and comfort provided by the decedent to the plaintiff. PROSSER & KF.E.•ON,
supra note 8, § 127, at 951-52.
15 See infra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
16 See, e.g., Bohlen, Right to Recover for Injury Re.iulling From Negligence Without Impact, 41 Am.
L. REG. N.S. 141 (1902).
17 See, e.g., Miller, The Scope of Liability for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress.' Mailing "The
Punishment Fit the Crime", 1 U. HAw. L. REV. 1 (1979).
18 See, e.g., Haley v. Pan American World Airways, 746 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1984) (applying
Louisiana law); Shu-Tao Lin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 742 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1984) (applying
New York law); Malacynski v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 565 F. Supp. 105 (S.D.N.Y: 1983) (applying
New York law); Platt v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 554 F. Supp. 360 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (applying
Michigan law).
19 See Fuchsberg, Damages for Pre-Impact Terror, 16 TRIAL. LAW. Q. (No. 3) 29 (1984).
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emotional distress," or because such distress does not fit within the particular test
adopted in that jurisdiction to separate lawful emotional distress claims from those for
which recovery will be denied. 21
This Article begins by tracing the evolution of judicial approaches to recovery for
emotional distress. 22
 This is followed by a discussion of the manner in which federal and
state courts have received recent claims for pre-impact distress, 23 with analysis of recent
decisions in these jurisdictions. 24 Finally, this Article suggests that whatever its ultimate
boundaries, emotional distress suffered by a person who realizes that he or she is about
to sustain serious harm or death due to a defendant's negligence, and who, in fact, is
harmed or dies as a proximate result of that negligence, should be compensable. Courts
should allow recovery without regard to whether the plaintiff can establish the elements
the law has required to guard against spurious claims in other actions for emotional
distress. The circumstances inducing the emotional distress provide significant safe-
guards against this risk, thus making other tests for genuineness superfluous. Concerns
that a defendant's potential liability may be unjustly disproportionate to his or her "mere
negligence" are assuaged by limiting the defendant to the already recognized duty of
not exposing a plaintiff to an unreasonable risk of physical harm.25
The timeliness of the subject matter is clear. Judicial recognition of pre-impact
distress as a compensable element of damages is relatively recent. 26 As word of its
acceptance spreads to potential litigants, 27 accompanied by a realization that it may allow
for a fairly substantial monetary award,28 more such claims will be advanced. When
presented with these claims as a matter of first impression, courts must consider whether
to decide the case pursuant to their jurisdiction's rule for other emotional distress claims
or adopt a new approach. This Article discusses how pre-impact emotional distress claims
fare under the more traditional approaches 29 and how courts could award damages
under a new test which comports with the rationale underlying the older rules."
II. JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO CLAIMS FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
At early English and American common law, courts generally accepted the idea that
emotional distress, standing alone, was not actionable. 3 ' The common law recognized no
2° See, e.g., Fogarty v. Campbell 66 Express, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 953 (D. Kan. 1986).
21 See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, 111. on May 25, 1979, 507 F. Supp. 21 (N.D.
III. 1980) (pre-impact distress claim dismissed because it did not fit within impact rule then existing
in Illinois); Fogarty v. Campbell 66 Express, Inc., 640 F. Siipp. 953 (D. Kan. 1986) (plaintiff failed
to show that pre-impact distress lit within the zone of danger approach to claims of emotional
distress); Nye v. Commonwealth, 331 Pa. Super. 209, 480 A.2d 318 (1984) (same).
22 See infra notes 31-161 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 163-285 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 295-348 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 350-58 and accompanying text.
2" The first case to allow recovery for such damages was decided in 1970. See Kozar v. Chesa-
peake & Ohio Ky., 320 F. Supp. 335 (W.D. Mich. 1970), aff 'd in part and vacated in part, 449 F.2d
1238 (fith Cir. 1971).
27 See infra notes 161-288 and accompanying text.
2" See infra note 165.
29 See infra . notes 288-349 and accompanying text.
s° See infra notes 350-62 and accompanying text.
3 ' F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 9.1 (1956); PROSSER & KEETON, SUpra note 8, at
§ 12 (5th ed. 1984); Magruder, Mental and Emotional Distress in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REv.
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legal duty to refrain from negligent conduct which created an unreasonable risk of
emotional distress, nor did it recognize a cause of action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. 32 Thus, in 1861 Lord Wensleydale was able to state without fear of
contradiction, "[m]ental pain and anxiety the law cannot value, and does not pretend to
redress, when the lawful act complained of causes that alone ...."33
judicial reluctance to award damages for mental distress stemmed from various
concerns. Some courts felt that the subjective nature of the injury rendered impossible
a precise measurement of the extent of the invasion. 34 Others believed that the proof
necessary to establish a causal link between the distress and the allegedly responsible
conduct was too speculative." Some courts also feared that recognizing this cause of
action would open the "floodgates of litigation," 36 especially with respect to trivial slights
1033, 1035 (1936). See, e.g., Summerfield v. Western Union Tel. Co., 87 Wis. 1, 8, 57 N.W. 973,
974 (1894).
52 See, e.g., Chapman v. Western Union Tel. Co., 88 Ga. 763, 773, 15 S.E. 901, 904 (1892) ("The
civil law is a practical business system, dealing with what is tangible, and does not undertake to
redress psychological injuries"); Purcell v. St. Paul City Ry., 48 Minn. 134, 137, 50 N.W. 1034, 1034
(1892) ("it may be conceded that any effect of a wrongful act or neglect on the mind alone will not
furnish a ground of action"). See also Bohlen, supra note 16, at 142 ("fright, mental suffering and
nervous shock ... do [not] constitute damage ....").
REsTA•Emcn•r (Flu•] .) of TORTS § 46 comment c (1034) summarized this view: "The interest in
mental and emotional tranquility and, therefOre, in freedom from mental and emotional disturb-
ances is not, as a thing itself, regarded as of sufficient importance to require others to refrain from
conduct intended or recognizably likely to cause such a disturbance," Id.
33 Lynch v. Knight, 9 H.L. Cas. 577, 598 (1861).
34 Southern Express Co. v. Byers, 240 U.S. 612, 615 (1916) ("merely mental pain and anxiety
are too vague for legal redress when no injury is dune to person, property, health or reputation."
(quoting authority omitted)); Cleveland, C., C, & St. L. Ry, v. Stewart, 24 Ind. App. 374, 390, 56
N.E. 917, 922-23 (1900) (mental distress without physical injury too speculative). See also Brody,
Negligently Inflicted Psychic Injuries: A Return to Reason, 7 Vim- L. REY. 232, 232 (1962) ("[courts
presumed that] psychic injuries were easy to feign and difficult to disprove"). One scholar attributes
such problems of proof to an old evidentiary rule which prohibited the parties themselves from
testifying. Bohlen, supra note 16, at 143.
Rut .see Kalen v. Terre Haute & I.R.R., 18 Ind. App. 202, 213, 47 N.E. 694, 697 (1897), where
the court stated: "We think it cannot properly be said that such injuries are imaginary or conjectural,
or that the sufferings described are not real." Id.
35 Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 167, 168-69, 142 A.2d 263, 266-67 (1958) (the courts are
fearful that the plaintiff will not be able to prove - because of the illusory nature of the evidence
- that the defendant's act was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury). See also Lgibsou,
Recovery of Damages for Emotional Distress Caused hy Physical Injury to Another, 15 J. FAM, L. 163, 164
(1977) ("insanity and other emotional illnesses were considered to be the result of one's own sins");
Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress: The Case for an Independent Tort, 59 GEO. L.J. 1237,
1259 (1971) [hereinafter Comment, Independent Tort] (recognizing that in some instances "proof of
existence and causation of the injury may be extremely difficult ,''). •
56 W.R. Harped v. E-Z Finance Co., 151 Tex, 641, 649, 254 S.W.2d 81, 86-87(1953), overruled,
Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, 424 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. 1967); Koplin v. Louis K. Liggett Co., 322
Pa. 333, 335, 185 A. 744, 744-45 (1936); Spade v. Lynn & B.R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 290, 47 N.E. 88,
89 (1897). Sinn v. Surd, 486 Pa. 146, 162-63, 404 A.2d 672, 678-79 (1974) (plurality). But see
Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 412-13, 261 A.2d 84, 89 (1970). The Niederman court stated:
It is the business of the law to remedy wrongs that deserve it, even at the expense of
a 'flood of litigation;' and it is a pitiful confession of' incompetence on the part of any
court of justice to deny relief upon the ground that it will give the court too much
work to do.
Id. (quoting Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. Rev. 874, 877
(1930)).
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and indignities.57 Finally, courts voiced concern that, at least where the plaintiff's cause
of action sounded in negligence, a defendant's potential liability could be grossly dispro-
portionate to his or her fault."
These concerns, however, did not inhibit an award of damages for mental distress
which courts found "parasitic" to other previously recognized causes of action in tort."
An independently actionable claim which produced loss apart from the alleged mental
anguish supposedly provided adequate protection against the abuses thought to accom-
pany recognition of a separate right to emotional tranquility.4° Plaintiffs appended
mental suffering to actions for the wrongful invasion of a recognized right41 so that it
became a compensable component in such causes of action as personal injury, 42 false
imprisonment 43
 trespass to land,44
 and wrongful interference with the plaintiff's trade
" Magruder, supra note 31, at 1035 (expressing concern that victims of trivial indignities would
resort to litigation as opposed to a "toughening of the mental hide" as a remedy). See also Swanson
v. Swanson, 121 111. App. 2d 182, 184-86, 257 N.E.2d 194, 196 (1970); Paxson v. Cass County Rds.
Comm's., 325 Mich. 276, 284, 38 N.W.2d 315, 318 (1949).
'8 See Spade v. Lynn & B.R.R., 168' Mass. 285, 290, 47 N.E. 88, 89 (1897) ("it is unreasonable
to hold persons who are merely negligent bound to anticipate and guard against fright and the
consequences of fright"); Bohlen, supra note 16, at 160 ("Public policy and conveniences forbid the
imposition of a duty to avoid acts likely to cause fright alone . ."). See also Molien v. Kaiser Found.
Hosp., 27 Cal. 916, 936, 616 P.2d 813, 825, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 843 (1980) (Clark, J., dissenting)
(arguing against recognizing tort for emotional distress alone, finding "imposition of liability is far
disproportionate to the degree of culpability" for negligently inflicting such damages).
The Hawaii and California courts recently addressed the concern that imposing liability for all
causally related emotional distress may be disproportionate to mere negligence by the defendant.
See Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970); Molien, 27 Cal. 916, 936, 616 P.2d 813,
825, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 843. Those courts were persuaded that such concerns justified limiting the
defendant's duty to one of avoiding exposing plaintiff to a risk of serious mental distress. Rodrigues,
52 Hawaii at 172, 472 P.2d at 520; Molien, 27 Cal. at 928, 616 P.2d at 819-20, 167 Cal. Rptr. at
837-38. For a discussion of these decisions, see infra notes 141-56 and accompanying text.
'9 Where the plaintiff alleged and proved a tortious invasion other than the resulting emotional
distress, the mental distress could then be considered in the computation of damages. See Langhenry,
Personal Injury Law and Emotional Distress, 31 FED. INS. Coutv. Q. 259, 260 (1981). Since the damages
for emotional distress depended on the existence of another tort, they have been called "parasitic."
F. HARPER, LAW OF TORTS § 67 (1933). See PROSSER & KEETON, Supra note 8, at § 12.
Even Lord Wensleydale, after making his famous generalization that the law does not redress
emotional harm alone, stated that, "though where a material damage occurs, and is connected with
[mental pain or anxiety], it is impossible a jury, in estimating it, should altogether overlook the
feelings of the party interested." Lynch v. Knight, 9 H.L. Cas. 577, 598 (1861).
40 Langhenry, supra note 39, at 260.
41 The First Restatement of Torts took the position that "if the actor has by his or her tortious
conduct become liable for an invasion of any legally protected interest of another, emotional distress
caused by the invasion or by the tortious conduct which is the cause thereof is taken into account
in assessing the damages recoverable by the other." RESTATEMENT (Filtsr) OF TORTS § 47(b) (1934).
Cf. Lewis v. Holmes, 109 La. 1030, 1034-35, 34 So. 66, 68 (1903), in which a claim for the anguish
experienced by a bride due to the defendant's failure to deliver her trousseau gowns in timely
fashion was attached to an action for breach of contract.
Mishoe v. Atlantic Coast Line & R.R. Co., 186 S.C. 402, 418-19, 197 S.E. 97, 104 (1938)
(wrongful death); Williams v. Underhill, 63 App. Div. 223, 225-26, 71 N.Y.S. 291, 292-93 (1901)
(assault).
43 Fisher v. Rumler, 239 Mich. 224, 228, 214 N.W..310, 311 (1927); Gadsen Gen. Hosp. v.
McGinty, 212 Ala. 531, 533, 103 So. 553, 554 (1925) (conceding the general correctness of the
verdict).
44 Cactus Drilling Co. v. McGinty, 580 S.W.2d 609 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (evidence insufficient
to support award for mental anguish); Sager v. Sisters of Mercy, 81 Colo. 498, 256 P. 8, 9 (1927).
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or business." As a result, plaintiffs with questionable emotional distress claims attached
to a legally cognizable cause of action could recover for that distress." Plaintiffs with
possibly meritorious claims which lacked an underlying independent tortious invasion,
however, were denied redress. 47
The first tentative step toward judicial recognition of an independent right to
emotional tranquility occurred in the context of intentionally inflicted mental suffering."
Civil liability for assault — the intentional creation of an apprehension of an imminent
battery49 — was firmly established in the common law." Nonetheless, courts were hesitant
to accord legal status even to intentional invasions of peace of mind absent an assault. 61
An English court, however, in the seminal case of Wilkinson v. Downton, recognized the
intentional infliction of emotional distress as a distinct and independent tort. 52 Although
American courts originally were reluctant to follow the English precedent, by 1930
intentional infliction of emotional distress had achieved general acceptance as an inde-
pendent cause of action."
Not all conduct designed to interfere with a plaintiff's peace of mind was actionable.
Recovery was restricted to those instances in which the plaintiff could characterize the
45 Guillory v. Godfrey, 134 Cal. App. 2d 628, 632-33, 286 P.2d 474, 477-78 (1955).
"See, e.g., Croaker v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 36 Wis. 657, 679, 17 Am. Rep. 504, 506 (1875)
(school teacher uninvitedly kissed by train conductor awarded $1000 in compensatory "damages"
for her "terror and anxiety, her outraged feeling and insulted virtue, for all her mental humiliation
and suffering"). See also Magruder, supra note 31, at 1054.
47 See, e.g., Chicago R.I. & P. Ry. v. Caple, 207 Ark. 52, 58, 179 S.W.2d 151, 154 (1944) (in
dicta, court noted that even if the train had stopped only inches before hitting the child whose foot
was caught in a railroad tie there could be no recovery for mental anguish suffered).
-
"One observer had commented as early as 1906 that "[Ole treatment of any element of
damage as a parasitic factor belongs essentially to a transitory stage of legal evolution. A factor
which is to-day recognized as parasitic will, forsooth, tomorrow be recognized as an independent
basis of liability." T. STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 470 (1906).
49 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 21 (1965).
5" See, e.g., I de S et ux. v. W de S, Y.B. Lib. Ass, 99, 60 (1348). Accord, Alexander v. Blodgett,
44 Vt. 476, (1872); Handy v. Johnson, 5 Md. 450 (1854). But see Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury
and Disease: Legal Liability for Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REV. 193, 194 (1944) in which the author
concludes that civil recovery for assault was due not to judicial solicitude for emotional tranquility
but to the desire to deter breaches of the peace.
51 See, e.g., Brooker v. Silverthorne, 111 S.C. 553, 99 S.E. 350 (1919); Kramer v. Ricksmeier,
159 Iowa 48, 139 N.W. 1091 (1913); Hixson v. Slocum, 156 Ky, 487, 161 S.W. 522 (1913); State v.
Daniels, 136 N.C. 571, 48 S.E. 544 (1904); Grayson v. St. Louis Transit Co., 100 Mo. App. 60, 71
S.W. 730 (1903).
" 2 Q.B. 57, 61 (1897), The egregiousness of the conduct in this case may have caused the
court to hold as it did. The defendant, a practical joker, falsely informed the plaintiff that her
husband had sustained serious injuries in an accident. This tale caused the plaintiff to suffer a
severe shock to her nervous system. Id. One early commentator concluded that the wrongfulness
of the act in Downton stemmed not from the intent to frighten the plaintiff and injure her peace of
mind, but because the act was calculated to cause her physical harm. Bohlen, supra note 16, at 147.
" See, e.g., Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Roch, 160 Md. 189, 153 A. 22 (1931); Johnson v.
Sampson, 167 Minn. 203, 208 N.W. 814 (1926). See generally Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CALIF.
L. REV. 40 (1956); Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 Mimi, L. REV.
874 (1935).
Liability for this invasion has since been extended to conduct which is merely reckless as opposed
to intentional. See Beck v. Libraro, 220 A. D. 547, 221 N.Y.S. 737 (1927). See generally PROSSER &
KEETON, supra note 8, at 12.
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defendant's actions as outrageous." It was this outrageousness, when considered in
conjunction with the defendant's moral guilt and the lack of social utility associated with
the conduct, that convinced the courts it was proper to protect the plaintiff's mental
state." The courts further extended liability to instances where a defendant's willful
physical attack on a victim caused a spectator-plaintiff to experience emotional distress,"
especially when the defendant was aware of the plaintiff's presence so that it could be
said that he or she was at least reckless in causing the distress. 57
 While the plaintiffs in
many of these instances sustained physical illness as a result of the emotional distress,"
the cause of action accrued where the plaintiff suffered severe mental disturbance even
without accompanying physical ailments."
Encouraged by increasing judicial recognition of a right to mental tranquility, plain-
tiffs who suffered emotional distress as a result of a defendant's negligence, as opposed
to his or her intentional or reckless conduct, began to seek legal redress for their
injuries.'") Nevertheless, even when the negligently inflicted emotional distress resulted
54
 This statement is summarized in the comments to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF' TORTS § 46
(1965). Comment d states;
It has not been enough that the defendant has acted with an intent which is tortious
or even criminal, or that he [or she] has intended to inflict emotional distress, or even
that his for her] conduct has been characterized by "malice," or a degree of aggravation
which would entitle the plaintiff' to punitive damages for another tort. Liability has
been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so
extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded
as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.
Id. One commentator has noted the danger of permitting recovery for merely insulting language:
"No pressing social need requires that every abusive outburst be converted into a tort; upon the
contrary, it would be unfortunate if' the law closed all the safety valves through which irascible
tempers might legally blow off steam." Magruder, supra note 31, at 1053.
The special duty owed by a common carrier to the public allowed courts to impose liability for
mental distress where the conduct was less than outrageous. See, e.g., Bleecker v. Colorado & So.
Ry., 50 Colo. 140, 114 P. 481 (1911); Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Luther, 40 Tex. Civ. App. 517, 523, 90
S.W. 44, 48 (1905) ("the liability of a corn carrier for insults by its servants causing humiliation,
a sense of disgrace, mental anguish or fear in a passenger, is independent of physical injury or
bodily harm"). Even this "common carrier" doctrine did riot, however, extend liability to encompass
petty insults.
55 See Krierim v. Izzo, 22 Ill. 2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157 (1961) (allowing recovery for outrageous
intentional conduct which is wholly lacking in social utility); Amdursky, Interest in Mental Tranquillity
[sic], 13 BUFFALO L. REv. 339, 345 (1964),
" See Lambert v. Brewster, 97 W. Va. 124, 125 S.E. 244 (1924).
57
 Taylor v. Vallelunga, 171 Cal. App. 2d 107, 339 P.2d 910 (1959). See cases cited in PROSSER
& KEETON, supra note 8, at § 12.
" See Price v. Yellow Pine Paper Mill Co., 240 S.W. 588 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) (miscarriage);
Wilkinson v. Downtown, 2 Q.B.D. 57, 58 (1897) (shock to nervous system caused permanent physical
damage). See generally Puossua & KEEToN, •upra note 8, at § 12.
59 State Rubbish Collectors ASS' Il v. Silizinoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 338, 240 P.2d 282, 286 (1952)
("it is anomalous to deny recovery because the defendant's intentional misconduct fell short of
producing sonic physical injury"). See generally cases cited in PROSSER & KEETox, supra note 8, at
§ 12. See also Magruder, supra note 31, at 1058. Magruder predicted the emergence of legal liability
for infliction of mental distress upon another as "one who, without just cause or excuse, and beyond
all the bounds of decency, purposely causes a disturbance of another's mental and emotional
tranquility of so acute a nature that harmful physical consequences might be not unlikely to result
... even though no demonstrable physical consequences actually ensue." Id.
60 See infra notes 62-90. See also L.S. CHARFOOS & D.W. CHRISTENSEN, PERSONAL INJURY PRAC-
TICE: TECHNIQUE AND TECHNOLOGY § 21.4 (1986).
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in serious physical illness, plaintiffs found the courts an unsympathetic forum.° In
Victorian Railway Commission v. Coultas, the Privy Council confronted the issue of whether
a plaintiff could recover for physical injury arising from negligently inflicted fright in
the absence of actual contact with the plaintiff's person. 62 The defendant gatekeeper
negligently had permitted a wagon to cross railroad tracks despite a fast-approaching
train. 63 The wagon narrowly escaped a collision with the train. Mary Coultas, a passenger
in the wagon, sued for damages For the physical injuries brought on by her fright . 61 The
Privy Council denied recovery, holding that the damages were too "remote" because the
defendant could not have anticipated that the plaintiff would suffer physical injury from
her fright, proof of causation was too difficult, and recognition of such a cause of action
would encourage spurious suits."3 A New York court, expressing similar concerns, con-
cluded that public policy demanded that even meritorious claims go uncompensated in
order to protect the judicial system from baseless suits, It denied recovery, therefore, to
a woman who suffered a miscarriage after defendant's runaway horses stopped perilously
near her without actually touching her.66
Confronted with increasing demands for recovery for negligently inflicted emotional
distress, courts began to allow recovery where the plaintiff could prove some element in
addition to the defendant's negligence and the resulting distress.° Courts required this
element in order to provide a "guarantee" of the claim's genuineness. 68 In some juris-
dictions the defendant's negligence had to include physical contact or "impact" with the
plaintiff's person. 69 Courts and commentators thought this contact assuaged some of the
traditional concerns associated with claims For mental distress." Other jurisdictions
" 1 See infra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
6' 13 App. Cas. 222 (P.C. 1888).
Id.
"Id. at 223.
65 Id. at 225-26.
"6 Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 109, 45 N.E. 354, 354 (1896), overruled, Battalla v.
State, 110 N.Y.2d 237, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34, 176 N.E.2d 729 (1961).
67 See infra notes 69-90 and accompanying text.
" See PROSSER & Krzrorst, supra note 8, § 54 at 363-64.
co See, e.g., St. Louis 1. M. & S. R.R. v. Bragg, 69 Ark. 402, 64 S.W. 226 (1901); Braun v. Craven,
175 111. 401, 51 N.E. 657 (1898); Kalen v. Terre Haute & 1.R.R., 18 Ind, App. 202, 47 N.E. 694
(1897); McGee v. Vanuver, 148 Ky. 737, 147 S.W. 742 (1912); Herrick v. Evening Publishing Co.,
120 Me. 138, 113 A. 16 (1921), overruled, Wallace v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 269 A.2d 117 (1970);
Spade v. Lynn & B.R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897), overruled, Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375
Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978); Nelson v. Crawford, 122 Mich. 466, 81 N.W. 335 (1899),
overruled, Daley v. LaCroix, 384 Mich. 4, 179 N.W.2d 390 (1970); McCardle v. Peck Dry Goods Co.,
191 Mo. App. 263, 177 S.W. 1095 (1915); Ward v. W. jersey & S.R.R., 65 N.J.L. 383, 47 A. 56l
(1900), overruled, Falzone v. Busch, 45 NJ. 559, 214 A.2d 12 (1965); Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151
N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896), overruled, Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 219 N.Y.S. 34, 176 N.E.2d
729 (1961); Miller v. Baltimore & O.S.W., 78 Ohio St. 309, 85 N.E. 499 (19(18), overruled, Schultz v.
Barberton Glass Co„ 4 Ohio St. 3d 13i, 447 N.E.2d 109 (1983); Ewing v. Pittsburgh C. & St. L.Ry.,
147 Pa. 40, 23 A. 390 (1892).
'" See, e.g., Ward, 65 N.J.L. at 385-86, 47 A. at 562 (impact necessary because physical injury
is not a natural result of fright, making causation difficult to prove; no precedent for holding
otherwise; flood of litigation involving easily feigned injuries); Mitchell, 151 N.Y. at 110, 45 N.E. at
354-55 (without impact, measure of damages too speculative). Some sources have suggested that
the true value of requiring impact lies in the opportunity it provides for the defendant to testify
that there was, in fact, no impact. Thus, a defendant may be able to swear that, within the statute
of limitations, he has struck no one with his automobile, whereas he cannot be sure whom he may
have frightened. PRossCx & KEETON, supra note 8, at § 54.
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adopted the "zone-of-danger" test and concluded that proof that the defendant exposed
the plaintiff to a risk of physical harm, and that mental distress manifested itself in
physical symptoms, 71 lent the necessary credence to the plaintiff's allegations. 72
Although the former test is referred to as the "impact" rule, in many early cases
decided under this approach, physical contact with plaintiff's person alone was not
sufficient. In addition, the contact had to cause actual injury to the plaintiff. 73 Thus, in
Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R., Co., the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts found
that "there can be no recovery for such physical injuries as may be caused solely by such
mental disturbance, where there is no injury to the person from without." 74 On a
71 See, e.g., Alabama Fuel & Iron Co. v. Baladoni, 15 Ala. App. 316, 321-24, 73 So. 205, 207-
08 (1916); Lindley v. Knowlton, 179 Cal. 298, 300-01, 176 P. 440, 441 (1918); Orlo v. Connecticut
Co., 128 Conn. 231, 238, 21 A.2d 402, 405 (1941); Goddard v. Watters, 14 Ga. App. 722, 726, 82
S.E. 304, 305-06 (1914); Watson v. Dilts, 116 Iowa 249, 252-53, 89 N.W. 1068, 1069-70 (1902);
Whitsel v. Watts, 98 Kan. 508, 510, 159 P. 401 (1961); Stewart v. Arkansas So. R.R., 112 La. 764,
768-69, 36 So. 676, 677-78 (1904); Green V. Shoemaker, 111  Md. 69, 82-83, 73 A. 688, 692-93
(1909); Purcell v. St. Paul City R.R., 48 Minn. 134, 138-39, 50 N.W. 1034, 1034-35 (1892); Cashin
v. Northern P. R.R., 96 Mont. 92, 101, 102, 28 P.2d 862, 865-66 (1934); Hanford v. Omaha &
Council Bluffs Street Ry., 113 Neb. 423, 440, 203 N.W. 643, 650 (1925); Chiuchiolo v. New England
Wholesale Tailors, 84 N.H. 329, 332, 150 A. 540, 542 (1930); Kimberly v. Howland, 143 N.C. 398,
404-05, 55 S.E. 778, 780-81 (1906); Salmi v. Columbia N. R.R., 75 Ore, 200, 206-09, 146 P. 819,
821 (1915); Simone v. Rhode Island Co., 28 R.I. 186, 204, 66 A. 202, 209 (1907); Mack v. South-
Bound R.R., 52 S.C. 323, 337, 29 S.E. 905, 910-11 (1897); Sternhagen v. Kozel, 40 S.D. 396, 398,
167 N.W. 398, 399 (1918); Memphis St. R.R. v. Bernstein, 137 Tenn, 637, 637, 194 S.W. 902, 903
(1917); Hill v. Kimball, 76 Tex. 210, 216, 13 S.W, 59, 59-60 (1890), overruled, Sanchez v. Schindler,
651 S,W.2d 249 (Tex. 1983); O'Meara v. Russell, 90 Wash. 557, 562-63, 156 P. 550, 552 (1916);
Lambert v. Brewster, 97 W. Va. 124, 138-40, 125 S.E. 244, 249-50 (1924); Pankopf v. Hinkley,
141 Wis. 146, 149, 123 N.W. 625, 627 (1909).
At the same time that various state courts were wrestling with the problem of when, if ever, to
permit recovery for emotional distress, the English courts were also moving away from the prop-
osition that emotional distress was not compensable. In Dulieu v. White & Sons, 2 K.B. 669, 671
(1901), the court allowed recovery for subsequently manifested physical injuries that the plaintiff
experienced as a result of emotional distress. In Dulieu, the plaintiff prematurely gave birth to a
severely handicapped child two months after defendant negligently drove his horsedrawn carriage
into her place of employment. Id. at 670. The court took issue with the proposition that such
physical injuries were "too remote" from the defendant's negligent act to allow recovery even
though they were not experienced contemporaneously with the negligence, noting that death by
poison is not considered too remote from the act of administering the poison although the injury
is not suffered contemporaneously. Id. at 677-78 (Kennedy, J.). Addressing concerns that causation
was difficult to establish, the judge stated that such problems could be avoided by careful consid-
eration of the proffered medical evidence and the requirement that the jury be satisfied that such
evidence supports the conclusion that the physical injury was a "direct and natural" effect of the
distress. Id. at 677 (Kennedy, J.).
72 See Smith, supra, note 50, at 207.
73 The impact initially had to be accompanied by actual injury. In Davis v, Cleveland Railway Co.,
where the plaintiff passenger was caught in the doors of the defendant's bus, recovery was denied
because the plaintiff was not physically injured. 135 Ohio St. 901, 407-08, 21 N.E.2d 169, 172-73
(1939). The court stated that where recovery for fright depended upon sustaining contemporaneous
physical injury, "such injury should be of sufficient gravity to bear some causal relation or proximate
relevancy to the fright and its consequences." Id. at 405, 21 N.E.2d at 171.
74 Spade v. Lynn & B.R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 290, 47 N.E. 88, 89 (1897) (Spade I). The plaintiff,
a passenger on the defendant's train, claimed that the conductor's negligence in removing a
passenger from the train caused a disturbance which frightened the plaintiff and caused her to
suffer continuing "great mental and physical pain and anguish ...." Id. at 285-86, 47 N.E. at 88.
September 1987)	 PRE-IMPACT EMOTIONAL DISTRESS	 891
subsequent appeal, the court refused to permit the plaintiff to proceed with her claim
despite an alleged slight impact's
Notwithstanding judicial pronouncements that the impact rule would guarantee the
genuineness of the emotional distress claim," it. also served to exclude meritorious
actions. Thus, a plaintiff who sought damages for a miscarriage allegedly caused by her
fear that she would be crushed to death by defendant's truck which careened toward
her, was denied recovery because of the merely fortuitous absence of physical contact."
Some jurisdictions, however, modified the impact with resulting physical injury rule to
permit claims for emotional distress after mere contact with the plaintiff, and thus
opened the courts to a broader class of litigants." Thus, in Zelinsky a. Chemics, a Penn-
sylvania court permitted plaintiffs to proceed with their claims for emotional distress
upon evidence that they had been 'jostled and jarred" in a collision between their
automobile and defendant's, although they suffered no physical injuries in the accident."
Even the "mere impact" requirement was diluted, however, as the courts, while
paying lip service to the rule, strained to find sonic impact in order to permit recovery. 80
Courts sustained awards despite often inconsequential contact which had no causal
relation to the emotional distress. 8 ' Such judicial fictions became commonplace, leading
one court to conclude that IfIraudulent claims are not likely to be eliminated by appli-
cation of the rule, since the slightest impact .. • [has] been found sufficient to satisfy the
The court admitted that its holding was an arbitrary one, but reasoned that it was based on what
was practicable for the great majority of cases. Id. at 288, 47 N.E. at 89.
75 172 Mass. 488, 52 N.E. 747 (1899) (Spade	 In the subsequent appeal, the plaintiff claimed
that a slight contact between her person and that of an inebriated fellow passenger, which occurred
as the conductor ejected another inebriated passenger, caused her to become emotionally upset and
seriously ill. Id. at 488, 52 N.E. at 747.
" See supra note 70.
" O'Brien v. Moss, 220 A.D. 464, 464-66, 221 N.Y.S. 621, 622-23 (1926). The court concluded
that where physical injury resulting from emotional distress is "neither preceded, accompanied,
nor followed by any sort of actual physical molestation," there can be no recovery. Id. at 465, 221
N.Y.S. at 623. See also Ward, 65 N.J.L. at 384, 47 A. at 562 (mere apprehension of personal injuries
which are not in fact sustained will not support a cause of action even where the mental disturbance
results in physical illness); Ewing v. Pittsburgh C. & St. L. R.R., 147 Pa. 40, 23 A. 340 (1891) (no
recovery for plaintiff's fright, which caused physical pain and disability, where collision threw
railroad cars into plaintiff's home but did not actually touch her).
"See, e.g., Interstate Life & Accident Co. v. Brewer, 56 Ga. App. 599, 193 S.E. 458 (1937)
(plaintiff hit by tossed coin); Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d 141 (Ky. 1980) (negligent exposure of
pregnant plaintiff to x-rays constituted sufficient contact to support a claim for mental suffering);
Chesapeake & 0. Ky. v. Robinett, 151 Ky. 778, 152 S.W. 976 (1913) (conductor pushed father
against plaintiff daughter); McGee v. Vanover, 148 Ky. 737, 147 S.W. 742 (1912) (defendant brushed
up.against plaintiff's hotly); Porter v. Delaware, L. & W. RR., 73 NUL. 405, 63 A. 860 (1906) (dust
in eyes).
79 196 Pa. Super. 312, 175 A.2d 351 (1961).
855ee infra note 81,
81 See, e.g., Petition of United States, 418 F.2d 264 (1st Cir. 1969) (physical consequences of
mental disturbance recoverable where impact shown even if impact is neither substantial nor causally
related to mental disturbance); Sam Finley, Inc. v, Russell, 75 Ga. App. 112, 42 S.E.2d 452 (1947)
(dust inhalation); Deutsch, 597 S.E.2d at 146 (slight or trivial contact sufficient impact when mental
distress results from contact); Philadelphia B. & W.R.R. v. Mitchell, 107 Md. 600, 69 A. 422 (1908)
(contact with plaintiff's umbrella); Morton v. Stack, 122 Ohio St. 115, 170 N.E. 869 (1906) (smoke
inhalation), overruled, Schultz v. Barberton Glass, 4 Ohio St. 3d 131, 447 N.E.2d 109 (1983); Hess
v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 358 Pa. 144, 56 A.2d 89 (1948) (falling electrical wire struck automo-
bile).
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rule's requirement." 82 Furthermore, regardless of whether impact occurred prior to the
plaintiff's exposure to the psychic stimulus" or afterwards, 84 courts compensated the
physical consequences resulting from emotional distress.
Many jurisdictions, after initially adopting the rule, abandoned the impact
requirement85 while others rejected it immediately. 86 Instead, courts began to permit
recovery for negligent invasions of mental tranquility by requiring that the plaintiff be
within the "zone of physical danger" created by defendant's negligence" and that the
" Jarchow v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 48 Cal. App. 3d 917, 933, 122 Cal. Rptr. 470, 481-
82 (1975), overruled, Quezada v. Hart, 67 Cal. App. 3d 754, 136 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1977). Other
criticisms abounded. Justice Must -Immo of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated:
The impact rule presupposes that there can be no damage done to a person's physical
structure unless a material object dashes against it. Yet we know that people die of
fright, persons faint from shock, and individuals collapse from grief, without any of
these unfortunates having been touched by the event which precipitated the disastrous
result,
Knaub v. Gotwalt, 422 Pa, 267, 275, 220 A.2d 646, 649 (1966) (Mustnanno, J., dissenting). Ad-
dressing the concern that the absence of impact would open the floodgates of litigation, the New
Jersey Supreme Court noted that "there is no indication of an excessive number of actions of this
type in other states which do not require an impact as a basis for recovery." Falzone v. Busch, 45
N.J. 559, 567, 214 A.2d 12, 16 (1965). See also Lambert, Tort Liability for Psychic injuries, 41 B.U.L.
RF.V. 584, 592 (1961). Lambert observes that "[t]he truth of the matter is that the feared flood tide
of litigation has simply not appeared in states following the majority rule allowing recovery of
psychic injuries without impact." Id.
But see Stewart v. Gilliam, where Chief Justice Reed dissented, stating:
I take it that there is more underlying the impact doctrine than simply problems of
proof, fraudulent claims, and excessive litigation. The impact doctrine gives practical
recognition to the thought that not every injury which one person may by his [or her]
negligence inflict upon another should be compensated in money damages. There
must be some level of harm which one should absorb without recompense as the price
he [or she] pays for living in an organized society.
271 So. 2d 466, 477 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
83 See, e.g., Caspermeyer v. Florsheim Shoe Store Co., 313 S.W.2d 198 (Mo. App. 1958);
Brisboise v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 303 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. 1957); Miller v. Baltimore &
O.S.W.R.R., 78 Ohio St. 309, 85 N.E. 499 (1908).
84
 Block v. Pascucci, 1 I l Conn. 58, 149 A. 210 (1930); Conley v. United Drug Co„ 218 Mass.
238, 105 N.E. 975 (1914); Driscoll v. Gaffey, 207 Mass. 102, 92 N.E. 1010 (1910); Cameron v. New
England Tel. & Tel. Co., 182 Mass. 310, 65 N.E. 385 (1902). See also Solomon v. Warren, 540 F.2d
777 (5th Cir. 1976), reh. den. en banc, 545 F.2d 1298 (1977), cert, dismissed sub nom, Warren v. Serody,
434 U.S. 801 (1977). c f. Cohn v. Ansonia Realty Co., 162 A.D. 791, 148 N.Y.S. 39 (1914) (plaintiff
observed her children riding in defendant's elevator with the doors open; she fainted and fell into
elevator shaft).
85 See, e.g., Towns v. Anderson, 195 Col. 517, 579 P.2(1 1169 (1978) (overruling the impact test);
Falzone v. Busch, 45 N.J. 559, 214 A.2d 12 (1960) (same); Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 392, 261
A.2d 84 (1970). In fact, as of this writing, only a few jurisdictions continue to adhere to the impact
rule. See I MtryzER, supra note 8, at § 5.13.
86 See, e.g., Purcell v. St. Paul City Ry., 48 Minn. 134, 50 N.W. 1034 (1892) (sustaining action
for injuries caused by fright when they are the natural consequence of a wrongful act or ommission).
See also Green v. T.A. Shoemaker & Co., Ill Md. 69, 73 A. 688 (1909); Watkins' v. Kaolin Mfg.
Cu., 131 N.C. 536, 42 S.E. 983 (1902).
87
 The "zone of physical danger" refers to the area of unreasonable risk of physical harm
created by the defendant's negligence. The test has its origins in the opinion authored by then
Judge Cardozo in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R,, 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N,E. 99 (1928). Noting that
liability for negligence required a demonstration that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff
and that the defendant breached that duty, Judge Cardozo held that a defendant's duty extended
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plaintiff's emotional distress be manifested in physical consequences." Courts deter-
mined that the plaintiff's presence within the zone of physical danger was necessary to
prevent unlimited liability." The second prong — resulting physical manifestations —
was necessary in order to provide adequate proof of the claim's validity.""
The zone-of-danger rule, with its physical manifestation requirement, has created
problems as well, First, there are many plaintiffs outside the zone of physical danger for
whom the defendant's conduct poses an unreasonable risk of emotional harm." 1 Also, it
is unclear what sort of physical manifestations of the emotional distress must be proven
in order to recover." 2 Furthermore, this latter requirement excludes those plaintiffs who
experience genuine mental distress which does not manifest itself in physical conse-
quences."'
only to those within the foreseeable tune-of-danger created by the defendant's negligence. Id. at
343, 192 N.E. at WO. Thus, only a plaintiff who is put in danger or actual physical harm by the
defendant's negligence can recover. This zone of danger encompasses a smaller area than the zone
of risk of foreseeable mental distress, consequently depriving a significant group of plaintiff's of
legal redress. Langhenry, supra note '39, at 264.
8' See, e.g., Keck v. Jackson, 122 Ariz. 114, 593 P.2d 668 (1979) (holding actions for recovery
for emotional distress limited to instances where the plaintiff suffered physical manifestations).
Under this test, a plaintiff who is unable to demonstrate that the emotional distress caused a physical
injury has no cause of action. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 't'out's § 436A (1965) states: "1r the actor's
conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of causing either bodily harm or emotional
disturbance to another, and it results in such emotional disturbance alone, without bodily harm or
other compensable damage, the actor is not liable for such emotional disturbance." Id.
89 Thus, a bystander has no cause of action for emotional distress sustained as a result of
witnessing the defendant negligently endanger another unless the bystander was also physically
imperiled by the negligence. REs•ATEmEN• (SECOND) or . Towrs § 436 comment f (1965).
99 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A comment b (1965), which notes that, in the
absence of the guarantee of genuineness provided by resulting bodily harm, such emotional dis-
turbance may be too easily feigned, depending, as it must, very largely upon the plaintiff's subjective
testimony and that to allow recovery fur it might open too wide a door for false claims by those
who have suffered no real harm at all. Id.
"See infra notes 94-103 and accompanying text.
92 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS provides that bodily harm must constitute both the unrea-
sonable risk and the result of the emotional disturbance. ItEsTATENIENT (SECOND) or Toners § 436
(1965). Section 436A makes it clear that not all physical manifestations guarantee a cause of action
and the difference between mere emotional harm and bodily harm may be one or degree only. Id.
at 436A. For example, comment c provides:
The rule stated in this Section applies to all forms of emotional disturbance, including
temporary fright, nervous shuck, nausea, grief, rage, and humiliation. The fact that
these arc accompanied by transitory, non-recurring physical phenomena, harmless in
themselves, such as dizziness, vomiting, and the like, does not make the actor liable
where such phenomena are in themselves inconsequential and do not amount to any
substantial bodily harm. On the other hand, long continued nausea or headaches may
amount to physical illness, which is bodily harm; and even long continued mental
disturbance, as for example in the case of repeated hysterical attacks, or mental
aberration, may be classified by the courts as illness, notwithstanding their mental
character. This becomes a medical or psychiatric problem, rather than one or law. •
Id. See, e.g., Allen v. Jones, 104 Cal. App. 3d 207, 216, 163 Cal, Rpm 445, 451 (1980) (Gardner, J.,
concurring) ("In no other area are the vagaries of our law more apparent than in the distinction
between mental and emotional distress accompanied by physical manifestation and such discomfort
unaccompanied by physical manifestation.").
95 See infra notes 116-20 and accompanying text,
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The first problem has been the subject of much scholarly9I and judicial
consideration" under the rubric of "bystander recovery" — that is, whether a third party
can recover for emotional distress suffered as a result of physical harm negligently
inflicted by a defendant upon another. Early cases uniformly denied recovery to a
bystander who was not himself or herself within the zone of physical danger." In the
1968 case of Dillon v. Legg, 97 however, the California Supreme Court held that a bystand-
er's foreseeable emotional distress, which ultimately caused physical injury, was com-
pensable even when the bystander was not in any direct peril from the defendant's
negligence. 98 The court limited the defendant's liability to bystanders by defining fore-
" Literally hundreds of articles discuss this issue. See, e.g., Diamond, Dillon v. Legg Revisited:
Toward a Unified Theory of Compensating Bystanders and Relatives for Intangible Injuries, 35 HASTINGS
L.J. 477 (1984); Nolan & Ursin, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Coherence Emerging from
Chaos, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 583 (1982); Pearson, Liability to Bystanders for Negligently Inflicted Emotional
Harm A Comment on the Nature of Arbitrary Rules, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 477 (1982); Leibson, Emotional
Distress, supra note 35; Note, The Negligent Infliction of Mental Distress: The Scope of Duty and Foreseeability
of Injury, 57 N.D. L. REV. 577 (1981); Comment, The Development of Recovery for Negligently Inflicted
Mental Distress Arising from Peril or Injury to Another: An Analysis of the American and Australian
Approaches, 26 EMORY L.J. 647 (1977); Comment, Negligence — Infliction of Emotional Harm — A
Suggested Analysis, 54 IOWA L. REV. 914 (1969).
" See infra notes 96-104 and accompanying text.
° See, e.g., Jelley v. Laflame, 108 N.H. 471, 238 A.2d 728 (1968) (because she was not in the
zone of danger, mother unable to recover for emotional distress when she witnessed her daughter
crushed to death); Lessard v. Tarca, 20 Conn. Supp. 295, 133 A.2d 625 (Super. Ct. 1957) (because
they were not in peril, parents and surviving siblings denied recovery for emotional distress sus-
tained after viewing another child burn to death in automobile fire); Waube v. Warrington, 216
Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1934) (because she was not in danger, mother who suffered serious
emotional distress after witnessing defendant run over her children denied recovery).
Interestingly enough, bystander recovery is compatible with the Restatement's approach so
long as the witness was within the zone of physical danger created by the defendant's negligence
and suffered physical harm as a result of the emotional distress. The comment to the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS (which, incidentally, permits recovery only where the direct victim is a member
of the bystander's immediate family) explains:
The reason for this exception to the general rule that there cannot be recovery for
emotional disturbance, or its consequences, arising from the peril of a third person
lies in the fact that the defendant, by his [or her] negligence, has endangered the
plaintiff's own safety and threatened him [or her] with bodily harm, so that the
defendant is in breach of an original duty to the plaintiff to exercise care for his [or
her] protection. When such a duty is violated, the defendant is not relieved of liability
for the bodily hartn to the plaintiff which in fact results, by reason of the unusual and
unforeseeable manner in which it is brought about.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoisto) or TORTS 436 comment f (1965). See also 1 MINZER, supra note 8, at § 5.23.
Action for bystander recovery, however, when the emotional distress is due only to witnessing
the personal injury of another cannot be successfully maintained under the impact doctrines. Cf.
Cohn v. Ansonia Realty Co., 162 A.D. 79], 148 N.Y.S. 39 (1914).
• 97 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968). In Dillon, a mother and daughter sued
to recover damages for the emotional distress they suffered After witnessing the defendant's auto-
mobile strike a sibling. Id. at 731, 441 P.2d at 914, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 74. Only the surviving daughter
was arguably within the zone-of-danger and, therefore, able to recover under the Restatement
approach. Id. at 732, 441 P.2d at 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75. The court, however, did not have to
decide whether emotional dist'ress alone was compensable, as both plaintiffs alleged resulting
physical injury. Id. at 733, 441 P.2d at 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
98 Id. at 741, 441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81. The court expressed dismay that a "few
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seeability in terms of the plaintiff's physical proximity to the incident, the plaintiff's
relationship to the victim, and whether the emotional distress resulted from a contem-
poraneous sensory perception of the incident as opposed to hearing of it later. 99
Like other tests governing recovery for emotional distress, the Dillon rule has gen-
erated much criticism."' It has, moreover, resulted in some incongruous holdings. For
example, in different cases the inflexible application of Dillon has precluded recovery by
a man who, upon receiving news by telephone of the death of his daughter and grand-
child, died of a heart attack,'°' by the live-in lover of the victim,'" and by the parent of
accident victims who arrived at the scene only seconds after the accident occurred.'"
The courts presently are considering whether a bystander-plaintiff may recover for
resulting emotional distress when the direct victim suffered only minimal injury.'"
yards" difference would deny the mother recovery for the physical manifestation of her emotional
distress, yet allow the daughter's action for the same damages. Id. at 733, 441 P.2d at 915, 69 Cal.
Rptr. at 75. It rebuffed the argument that the potential for fraudulent claims justified the denial
of liability, reasoning that such a possibility did not justify rejection of meritorious claims. Id. at
736, 441 P.2d at 917-18, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 77-78.
," Id. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. By emphasizing the importance of the
foreseeability of the risk, the court attempted to assuage fears that bystander recovery would result
in unlimited liability for the defendant. Id. at 731, 441 P.2d at 914, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
In D'Ambra v. United Shoe, the court also sought to limit a defendant's potential liability for a
bystander's distress by resorting to the Forseeability test. 354 F. Supp. 810, 820 (D.R.I. 1973). The
D'Ambra court, however, rejected the Dillon foreseeability factors in Favor of the following consid-
erations: (1) the age of the child; (2) the type of neighborhood; (3) the tortfeasor's familiarity with
the neighborhood; (4) the time of day; and (5) any other circumstances which put the tortfeasor
on notice of likelihood of the parent's presence. Id.
See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 94, at 478 (Dillon criteria an inappropriate guide to question
of foreseeability); Pearson, supra note 94, at 478 (Dillon rule as arbitrary as zone of danger test it
replaced); PROSSER & KEETON, Supra note 8, at § 54. See also Whetham v. Bismarck Hosp., 197
N.W.2d 678, 684-85 (N.D. 1972) (Dillon places undue burden on one who is merely negligent).
'°' Kelley v. Kokua Sales & Supply, Ltd., 56 Hawaii 204, 206, 209, 532 P.2d 673, 675, 676
(1975) (decedent located at unreasonable distance from accident excluded from defendant's duty
of due care, as liability is otherwise "unmanageable, unbearable, and totally unpredictable").
'" Drew v. Drake, 110 Cal. App. 3d 555, 558-59, 168 Cal. Rptr. 65, 65-66 (1980). Cf. Mobaldi
v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 55 Cal. App. 3d 573, 586, 127 Cal. Rptr. 720, 728 (1976), cited with
disapproval by Baxter v. Superior Court, 19 Cal, 3d 461, 466, 563 P.2d 871, 874, 138 Cal. Rptr. 315,
318 (1977); Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 411, 520 P.2d 758, 766 (1974) (absence of blood
relationship between victim and plaintiff-witness not determinative; plaintiff, step-grandson of
victim, entitled to prove nature of relationship and extent of damages suffered due to relationship);
Eyrich v. Dam, 193 N.J. Super. 244, 255, 473 A.2d 539, 545 (1984) (close family friend who acted
as surrogate father to young victim permitted recovery).
105 Parsons v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. App. 3d 506, 510, 513, 146 Cal. Rptr. 495, 406, 409,
(1978) (plaintiff reached accident scene "before dust had settled" but in absence of evidence that
plaintiff "saw, heard, or otherwise sensorily perceived the injury-producing event," no recovery permitted)
(emphasis in original). But compare Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass, 555, 380 N.E,2d 1295 (1978)
(parent who arrived at accident scene while injured child still present entitled to recover despite
not being there when accident occurred).
104 See Versland v. Caron Transp., 671 P.2d 583, 588 (1983) (bystander's serious emotional
distress foreseeable only when defendant's negligence caused serious injury or death to direct
victim); Ramirez v. Armstrong, 673 P.2d 822, 825-26, 100 N.M. 538, 541-42 (N.M. 1983) (same);
Porter v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 100-01, 417 A.2d 521, 527-28 (1980) (harm which does not cause
grievous bodily injury or result in the death of a direct victim does not ordinarily result in serious
emotional distress of a bystander; therefore, minimal harm does not present an "unreasonable"
risk of emotional distress to a witness).
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The zone-of-danger test also requires the physical manifestation of emotional dis-
tress.'° 5
 The extent of physical manifestation required, however, is the source of much
dispute,'"6 as all emotional distress has some physical effect on the sufferer. 1 U 2 Thus,
recovery depends not upon the existence of physical consequences but, rather, upon
policy choices concerning the degree of these consequences.'° 6 In part, this disagreement
arises from phraseology. The Restatement of Torts requires that physical or bodily harm
result from the emotional distress,'° 5 but the Restatement's comments suggest that brief
periods of dizziness, nervousness, and vomiting are "inconsequential" and insufficient to
prove emotional distress because they do not constitute "substantial" bodily harrn."°
Whereas some zone-of-danger jurisdictions have adopted the Restatement's "physical
harm" language,"' others have allowed recovery when the emotional distress results in
"physical consequences,"" 2 "objective symptomatology," 15 or "physical manifesta-
tions.""4
 Furthermore, manifestations of emotional distress that one court finds suffi-
ciently physical another court finds purely mental. 15 This suggests that even once de-
cided upon, courts often apply the criteria arbitrarily.
'" This requirement. also surfaces in cases involving bystander recovery. See Dillon v. Legg, 68
Cal. 2d 728, 740, .441 P.2d 912, 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 80 (1968) (in addition to meeting foresecability
test, plaintiff's mother also suffered physical manifestations of her severe emotional distress). See
supra notes 97-99 arid accompanying text.
See infra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
107 Schwartz, Neurosis Following Trauma, TRAUMA, Dec. 1959, at 32. See infra note 117.
'"B Comment, Independent Tort, supra note 35, at 1241 n.24 (1971) (discussing courts' difficulties
in formulating standards by which to examine "mental" and "physical" injuries for purposes of
allowing recovery).
" RESTATEMENT (SEcorm) OF TORTS 436A (1965).
10 Id. at comment c. The comments do note that continuing attacks of these otherwise harmless
physical phenomena may constitute a physical illness. Id. Similarly, repeated attacks of hysteria,
which individually might be classified as a mental disturbance, may also amount to a physical illness.
Id.
"' See, e.g., Robb.v. Pennsylvania R.R., 58 Del. 454, 465, 210 A.2d 709, 715 (1965); Keck v.
Jackson, 122 Ariz. 114, 115, 593 P.2d 668, 669 (1979); M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 268 Ark. 269, 278,
596 S.W.2d 681, 686 (1980); Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 547, 437 N.E.2d 171, 176
(1982); see also Falzone v. Busch, 45 N.J. 559, 569, 214 A.2d 12, 17 (1965) (substantial bodily injury
or sickness). Compare Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 404, 165 A. 182, 184 (1933) (clear and
substantial physical injury) with Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 98 III. 2d 546, 555, 457 N.E.2d 1,
5 (1983) (physical injury or illness).
12 See Barnhill v. Davies, 300 N.W.2d 104, 107 (Iowa 1981) (although recognizing that mental
distress can Occur absent physical symptoms, court suggested compensation only when distress
results in physical injury); Falzone v. Busch, 45 N.J. 559, 569, 214 A.2(1 12, 17 (1965) (substantial
bodily injury or sickness); Chisum v. Gehrens, 283 N.W.2d 235, 240 (S.D. 1979) (physical injury).
"3 Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 659, 406 A.2d 300, 308 (1979) ("objective physical symp-
toms"); Corrigal v. Ball & Dodd Funeral Home, 89 Wash. 2d 959, 962, 577 P.2d 580, 582 (1978)
("objective symptoms"); HunSley v. Giant 87 Wash: 2d 424, 436, 553 P.2d 1096, 1102 (1976).
t4
 Towns v. Anderson, 195 Colo. 517, 519, 579 P.2d 1163, 1165 (1978) (physical manifestations
of mental illness); cf. D'Ambra v. United States, 114 R.I. 643, 657, 338 A.2d 524, 531 (1975)
(bystander recovery permitted only when emotional harm results in "physical symptoms"); Lange-
land v. Farmers State Bank, 319 N.W.2d 25, 31 (Minn. 1982) ("physical symptoms").
In Ricky v. Chicago Transit Auth., 98 III. 2d 546, 457 N.E.2d 1 (1983), the court alternatively,
and perhaps indiscriminately, referred to a requirement of "physical injury or illness" and "physical
manifestations."
15
 See, e.g., Daley v. LaCroix, 384 Midi. 4, 15, 179 N.W.2d 390, 306 (1970) (lay testimony that
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The physical consequences requirement has one final problem. Because it does not
permit recovery for genuine emotional distress claims which do not manifest themselves
physically," 6 this clement perhaps encourages extravagant pleading by plaintiffs so as to
bring their cases within the rule. 17 Emotional distress - the victim's mental response to
traumatic stimuli" 8 - may prompt psychic reactions which doctors can ascertain and
minor plaintiff was nervous sufficient to create jury question on issue of "definite and objective
physical injury"; dissent felt only indefinite and subjective injury involved). Cf. Sinn v. Burd, 486
Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1979) (plurality held plaintiff's complaint of "severe depression" and "acute
nervous condition" resulting from watching defendant negligently run over and kill her child was
sufficient for "physical and mental injuries"; dissent found "emotional injury" only).
In Michigan, withdrawal from society, combined with continued depression and an inability to
function normally, was sufficient to constitute a "definite physical injury." Toms v. McConnell, 45
Mich. App. 647, 657, '207 N.W.2d 140, 145 (1973). California courts have found the required
physical injury where plaintiff alleged gastric disturbance, loss of' sleep, and nervous disorder;
Krouse v. Graham, 19 Cal. 3d 59, 77, 562 P.2d 1022, 1031, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863, 872 (1977); Espinosa
v. Beverly Hosp., 114 Cal. App. 2d 232, 236, 249 P.2d 843, 845 (1952); anxiety, grief, shock, worry,
distress, mortification, indignity, and humiliation; Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 433,
926 P.2d 173, 178, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 18 (1967); nausea; Medeiros v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 57 Cal.
App. 2d 707, 714, 135 P.2d. 676, 680 (1943); and nervousness; Taylor v. Pole, 16 Cal. 2d 668, 671,
l07 P.2d 614, 616 (1940). But see Cosgrove v. Berner, 244 F. Supp. 824, 826 (1).Del. 1965) (dizziness,
mild headaches, and nervousness insufficient symptoms of bodily harm).
u dge McEntree of the First Circuit commented upon the confusion generated by the require-
ment of physical consequences:
The term "physical" is not used in its ordinary sense for purposes of applying the
"physical consequences" rule. Rather, the word is used to indicate that the condition
or illness for which recovery is sought must be one susceptible of objective determi-
nation. Hence, a definite nervous disorder is a "physical injury" sufficient to support
an action for damages for negligence.
Petition of United States, 418 F.2d 264, 269 (Ist Cir. 1969).
One scholar has noted that the requirement of physical injury is a concept capable of manip-
ulation by the plaintiff: "In the hands of a creative and sympathetic judge, very little in the way of
emotional reaction would escape being characterized as physical harm." Pearson, supra note 94, at
509-10 & n.179.
1113 See infra notes . 198-213 and accompanying text. Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 413, 520
P.2d 758, 767 (1974) (concluding that some menial responses, though painful to the individual, are
not accompanied by physical injury).
117 SeeMolien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 929, 616 P.2d 813, 820, 167 Cal. Rpm
831, 838 (1980) (physical injury requirement "encourages extravagant pleading and distorted
testimony"). Annotation, Right to Recover for Emotional Disturbance or its Physical Consequences, in the
Absence of Impact or Other Actionable Wrong, 64 A.L.R.2d 100, 117 n.18 (1959) ("Mn most instances
of severe mental disturbance some deleterious physical consequences can, with a little ingenuity, be
found .. .").
" 8 Psychic trauma is "all emotional shock that makes a lasting impression on the mind ...."
Cantor, Psychosomatic injury, Traumatic Psycboneurosis and Law, 6 CLEY. MARSHALL L. REV, 428, 430
(1957). The stimulation can be physical, in the sense that it involves sonic impact with the plaintiff's
person, purely psychic, or a combination of the two. Id. Laughlin, Neuroses Following Trauma, in 6
TRAUMATIC MEDICINE Arm SURGERY FOR THE ATTORNEY 76 (P. Cantor ed. 1962).
Traumatic stimuli may induce either primary or secondary reactions, or both. Comment,
independent Tort, supra note 35, at 1249. Primary responses, such as "fear, anger, grief, shock,
humiliation, or embarrassment," are an individual's first reactions to the stimulus. Id. They are
immediate and automatic, designed to protect the person from harm or unpleasantness, and
produce only fleeting disturbances. Id. The victim experiences both biological and psychological
attempts to restore equilibrium alter exposure to the stimulus. Id, n.68. See also Smith & Solomon,
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evaluate. 19
 But emotional distress may also consist of more fleeting unpleasant responses
not easily subject to such measurement and proof. 12G
In two types of recurring fact patterns, some courts have allowed a plaintiff to
recover for emotional distress without showing impact, placement within the zone of
physical danger, or physical consequences resulting from the distress.'2 ' The first fact
pattern concerns the negligent transmission of a message informing the plaintiff of a
relative's death. 122
 Courts have characterized this emotional distress as the "natural
consequence" of the failure to relay promptly or, in some cases, accurately, such mes-
sages.'" Some jurisdictions have recognized a similar exception for the family of a
decedent whose corpse has been mistreated.' 14
 One court explained judicial willingness
to recognize these exceptions by noting that the surviving relatives' mental distress "is
not only the natural and probable consequence of the character of the wrong committed,
Traumatic Neuroses in Court, VA. L. REV. 97, 123-25 (1944), for a discussion of the difference
between nervous shock and traumatic neurosis.
Secondary reactions to a stimulus represent a more severe response termed "traumatic neu-
rosis." Comment, Independent Tort, supra note 35, at 1250. "Neurosis" is defined as "a severe
emotional disorder characterized by disturbances of thought, feeling or behavior which vary sig-
nificantly from that common to the patient's culture ...." Id. Although these neuroses are not
always demonstrated by physical symptoms, they are subject to medical proof with reasonable
certainty as to their existence and extent. Amdursky, supra note 55, at 351. Examples of traumatic
neuroses include phobic reactions, conversion reactions, obsessive-compulsive reactions, and depres-
sion. Comment, Independent Tort, supra note 35, at 1205-51 & n.82.
" 9 See Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 931, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839 (suggesting that plaintiffs
will be able to prove some types of emotional distress through medical testimony). See also Leong,
55 Hawaii at 413, 520 P.2d at 767.
129
 The Hawaii Supreme Court has noted that more transient emotional responses - the
primary responses - while producing considerable suffering for the individual, are often incapable
of precise determination because of their subjective nature and possibly short duration, and because
physical injury does not always accompany them. Leong, 55 Hawaii at 413, 520 P.2d at 767. See also,
Comment, Independent Tort, supra note 35, at 1252.
121 MtNZER, supra note 8, 7.30; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, 54.
' 22
 Western United Tel. Co. v. Thomas, 209 Ala. 657, 96 So. 873 (1923) (failure to deliver
telegram promptly caused plaintiff to reach home after father's death); Russ v. Western Union Tel.
Co., 222 N.C. 504, 23 S.E.2d 681 (1943) (failure to deliver telegram resulted in plaintiff's learning
of brother's death subsequent to burial); Relle v. West&n United Tel. Co., 55 Tex. 308, 40 Am.
Rep. 805 (1881) (failure to deliver timely message of mother's death prevented plaintiff from being
present at funeral services). See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, at 54. But see Western Union
Tel. Co. v. Choteau, 28 Okla. 664, 115 P. 879 (1911) (when emotional distress due to delayed
delivery of telegram advising plaintiff of father's death resulted in no physical injuries, recovery
denied). In New York, this exception has been extended to the negligent transmission of any type
of message advising plaintiff of a relative's death. See Johnson v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 334 N.E.2d
590, 372 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1975) (hospital erroneously told plaintiff her mother had died); Jenkins v.
State, 119 Misc. 2d 144, 146, 462 N.Y.S.2d 766, 768 (1983) (hospital erroneously informed family
that their son had died).
in Relic v. Western Union Tel. Co., 55 Tex. 308, 313, 40 Am. Rep. 805, 807 (1881).
124 See e.g., Allen v. Jones, 104 Cal. App. 3d 207, 214, 163 Cal. Rptr. 445, 450 (1980) (recovery
for emotional distress permitted when defendant-morticians negligently lost cremated remains of
plaintiff's brother). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or TORTS 868 (1965).
While courts initially justified damage awards for emotional distress caused by the mishandling
of a corpse as parasitic to the invasion of a property right, see RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS
868 (1965), comment a, the modern approach recognizes the cause of action as one exclusively
for emotional distress. Johnson v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 382, 334 N.E.2d 590, 592, 372 N.Y.S.2d
638, 641-42 (1975) (disputing argument that award for emotional distress resulting from corpse
mishandling arose from plaintiff's property right in the bodies).
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but indeed is frequently the only injurious consequence to follow from it."'" Dean
Prosser has concluded that these two exceptions share an "especial likelihood of genuine
and serious emotional distress" and that the unusual facts provide a safeguard against
spurious claims which obviate the need for other tests of the claim's validity.' 20 He has
further suggested that whenever the facts giving rise to the distress include a similar
assurance of the genuineness of the alleged mental distress, recovery for emotional
distress alone should be permitted. 127
Following Dean Prosser's suggestion, two jurisdictions have, in fact, extended the
exceptions allowing recovery for mental distress, despite the lack of impact or resultant
physical injuries, to those situations where the circumstances giving rise to the claim
attest to the genuineness of the distress.'" The New York courts have concluded that
when a plaintiff is placed in unreasonable risk of physical harm as a direct result of the
defendant's negligence, but experiences only emotional distress, the facts giving rise to
the claim provide sufficient proof of its genuineness and the plaintiff' need not demon-
strate resulting physical manifestations. 129 The defendant's duty under this rule, as under
1211 Crenshaw v. O'Connell, 235 Mo. App. 1085, 1093, 150 S.W.2d 489, 493 (1941).
120 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, at § 54.
127 Id. Dean Prosser stated that "[t]here may perhaps be other such cases. Where the guarantee
can be found, and the mental distress is undoubtedly real and serious, there may be no good reason
to deny recovery." U. (footnote omitted). See also Jenkins v. State, 119 Misc. 2d at 146, 462 N.Y.S,2d
at 768 (hospital mistakenly told parents that patient son was dead; court found this the type of
unordinary situation where it is readily apparent that sonic emotional distress would be caused by
the subject events); Allen v. Jones, 104 Cal. App. 3d 207, 214-15, 163 Cal. Rptr. 445, 450 (1980)
(damages recoverable for mental distress without evidence of physical harm for defendant's negli-
gent mishandling of corpse; "the nature of wrongful conduct ... provides sufficient assurance of
genuineness of a claim For emotional distress").
Dean Prosser did not define what he meant by a "guarantee of genuineness" arising from the
facts. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, § 54, It seems obvious, however, that he was referring
to the idea that reasonable persons viewing the defendant's conduct would find that it exposed the
plaintiff to an unreasonable risk of genuine mental distress. Where reasonable persons are capable
of discerning the presence of such a risk in the facts of the case, other "tests" of genuineness present
an unnecessary hurdle to recovery. Cf. Quill v. Trans World Airlines, 361 N.W.2d 438, 443 (Minn.
App. 1985) (discussing Dean Prosser's approach and concluding that it applied where the "unusually
disturbing facts" of the case "assure that [the plaintiff's] claim is real").
128 See infra notes 129-40 and accompanying text.
125 Green v. Liebowitz, 118 A.D.2d 756, 757-58, 500 N.Y.S.2d 146, 148-49 (1986) (recovery
denied); Kennedy v. McKesson Co., 58 N.Y.2d 500, 504, 506, 448 N.E.2d 1332, 1334, 1335, 462
N.Y.S.2(1 421, 423, 424 (1983). See also Young v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 123 Misc. 2d 580, 474
N.Y.S.2d 886 (1983), modified, 104 A.D.2c1 84, 481 N.Y.S.2d 891 (plaintiff' permitted to recover for
emotional distress experienced as a result of an explosion allegedly caused by defendant's negli-
gence); Ford v. Village Imports, 92 A.D.2d 717, 461 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1983) (claim dismissed where
emotional distress resulted from driving in negligently manufactured automobile which malfunc-
tioned; no proof that plaintiff feared for her own safety).
Initially, New York followed the impact rule. Thus, claims of emotional distress, even if'
accompanied by resulting injuries, were denied. The court justified the denial of recovery on the
grounds that such claims were susceptible to fraud and could potentially become a source of much
spurious litigation. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 110, 45 N.E. 354, 354-55
(1896). In 1961, the New York Court of Appeals, professing reliance on the ability of the medical
profession and the jury to distinguish between spurious and genuine claims, overruled Mitchell and
permitted recovery by a plaintiff who had been placed in danger of physical injury by defendant's
negligence, but suffered only emotional distress with consequential injuries. Battalla v. State, 10
N.Y.2c1 237, 239, 242, 176 N.E.2d 729, 730, 731-32, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34, 35, 38 (1961).
' New York courts later recognized exceptions to the resulting physical injury requirement. See,
e.g., Lando v. State, 39 N.Y.2(1 803, 803-04, 351 N.E.2c1 426, 426-27, 385 N.Y.S.2d 759, 759-60
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the zone-of-danger test, however, is only to avoid exposing the plaintiff to the unrea-
sonable risk of physical harrn. 10
 When the defendant's negligence has created only a
(1976) (court affirmed a lather's recovery for emotional distress despite no resulting physical injury
when the defendant hospital lost his deceased daughter's body for eleven days). Johnson v. State
presented the Court of Appeals with a claim for emotional harm suffered by the daughter of
patient in a state hospital who was falsely informed that the patient had died. 37 N.Y.2d 378, 379-
80, 334 N.E.2d 590, 590-91, 372 N.Y.S.2d 638, 639 (1975). Although the plaintiff produced
evidence of resulting physical symptoms, the court devoted much of its discussion to the death
message and negligent mishandling of' corpse exceptions to the physical injury rule, suggesting that
other exceptions would be recognized where the circumstances create "an especial likelihood of'
genuine and serious mental distress" and "a guarantee that the claim is not spurious." Id. at 382,
334 N.E.2d at 592, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 642 (quoting W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF 'FORTS
§ 54 (4th ed. 1971)).
New York courts later recognized an additional exception to the resulting physical injury
requirement. In Kennedy v. McKesson Co., the New York Court of Appeals reviewed past cases
regarding claims for emotional distress. 58 N.Y.2d 500, 448 N.E.2d 1332, 462 N.Y.S.2d 421 (1983).
The Kennedy court read Balmlla and Johnson as supporting its conclusion that "when there is a duty
owed by defendant to plaintiff, breach of that duty resulting directly in emotional harm is com-
pensable even though no physical injury occurred." Id. at 504, 448 N.E.2d at 1334, 462 N,Y.S.2d
at 423. The Kennedy court characterized those cases as involving situations where evidence of physical
harm was unnecessary to establish reliability due to the "sophistication of the medical profession
and the likelihood of genuine and serious mental distress arising from the circumstances of the
case." Kennedy, 58 N.Y.2d at 504-05, 448 N.E.2d at 1334, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 423.
The "duty owed," however, is apparently to avoid putting the plaintiff in an unreasonable risk
of physical danger. Merely creating an unreasonable risk of causing emotional distress constitutes a
cause of action only when it falls within a recognized exception. Thus, the Supreme Court of New
York recently concluded that New York recognizes an exception to the physical injury rule when
emotional harm results from the mishandling of a corpse, the transmission of a false death message,
and where the defendant's breach of duty has "unreasonably endangerIedi the plaintiff's physical
safety." Green v. Liebowitz, 118 A.D.2d at 757, 500 N.Y.S.2d at 148-49 (quoting Bovsun v. Sanperi,
61 N.Y.2d 219, 229, 461 N.E.2d 843, 847, 473 N.Y.S.2d 357, '361 (1984)).
' 30
 In Johnson v. Jamaica Hosp., 62 N.Y.2d 523, 467 N.E.2d 502, 478 N.Y.S.2d 838 (1984), the
court denied recovery for emotional distress by the parents of an infant who had been abducted
from defendant hospital's nursery, concluding that the hospital owed no direct duty to the parents
to prevent such distress. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, permitted recovery despite the
lack of physical injury, holding that the circumstances provided a guarantee of the claim's genu-
ineness, 95 A.1).2d 598, 600, 467 N.Y.S.2d 639, 636 (citing Johnson v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 334
N.E.2d 590, 372 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1975)). The Court of Appeals, however, focused upon the fact that
despite the foreseeability of the parent's psychic injury, the only direct duty breached was one owed
by the hospital to the abducted child. Jamaica Hospital, 62 N.Y.2d at 528, 467 N.E.2d at 504, 473
N.Y.S.2d at 840,
Similarly, in Fusco v. G.M. Corp., 126 Misc. 2d 998, 485 N.Y.S.2d 431 (1984), the plaintiff's'
claim for emotional distress, unaccompanied by physical manifestations, was dismissed, although it
arose when the Cadillac in which they were driving malfunctioned, "was thrown out of' control,"
and came to a sudden stop. Id. at 998, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 432. The Fusco court agreed that the
defendant manufacturer owed a direct duty to the plaintiffs, but concluded that the case lacked a
"guarantee of genuineness." It was not "readily apparent to a lay[person]" that emotional distress
would accompany this event, in the court's view, as cars malfunction all the time without resulting
mental injury. Id. at 1003, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 436 (citation omitted). The court was careful to note,
however, that circumstances may exist in which the malfunction of a vehicle could result in com-
pensable mental harm. Cf. Ford v. Village Imports, 92 A.D.2d 717, 461 N.Y.S.2d 1088 (1983) (court
dismissed claim for emotional distress resulting from driving in negligently manufactured auto-
mobile which malfunctioned; court found no proof' that plaintiff' feared for her own safety).
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risk of emotional as opposed to physical distress, recovery is not available unless the facts
bring the case within another recognized exception."'
Similarly, the Minnesota Court of Appeals has seized upon Dean Prosser's "guar-
antee of genuineness from the circumstances" approach to allow recovery for emotional
distress which manifested itself in comparatively slight physical symptoms." 2 In Quill u.
Trans World Airlines, Inc.,'" a passenger brought an action for negligent infliction of
recurring emotional distress brought about when the defendant's plane, which had been
cruising at 39,000 feet, suddenly rolled over and dove 34,000 feet in an uncontrolled
tailspin for approximately forty seconds."' While the pilots were able to regain control
of the plane and land it safely, the plaintiff, who did not suffer any physical injury in
the ordeal, testified that on as many as half of his subsequent air travels, he experienced
anxiety which manifested itself in "adrenaline surges, sweaty hands, elevated pulse and
blood pressure."'" The court phrased the issue before it as "whether plaintiff has
satisfied the physical injury or symptom requirement" so as to permit recovery in a
jurisdiction which adhered to the zone-of-danger test.'" The court agreed that the Quill
plaintiff's symptoms were "less severe" than those found in prior decisions which ordered
recovery for emotional distress.'" The court noted, however, that limited exceptions to
the resulting physical injuries requirement had been recognized and that Dean Prosser
had suggested the possibility of additional exceptions when the facts suggest that the
claim is meritorious."' The appellate court agreed with the trial court's statement that
the "unique nature of the accident in this case [resolves] all doubts of the genuineness
15) See Lands, 39 N.Y.2d 803, 351 N.E.2d 426, 385 N.Y.S.2d 759 (1976); Johnson, 37 N.Y.2d
378, 334 N.E.2d 590, 372 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1975).
"2 Quill v, Trans World Airlines, 36i N.W.2d 438, 443 (Minn. App. 1985).
Id. at 438.
' 31 1d. at 440. The gravitational force on the passengers was so great that the plaintiff could
not lift Iris arm to reach the oxygen mask that had fallen from the compartment above his seat. At
approximately 5000 feet, live seconds before the plane would have struck the ground, the pilots
regained control. However, for the next 40 minutes, until the plane landed safely, the plane
continued to shake and make unusual noises. The pilot informed the passengers that they had
experienced some problems and would have to make an emergency landing. Flight attendants
instructed the passengers on the emergency landing position, and the plaintiff was able to see
emergency vehicles near the runway awaiting the plane's landing. Id.
", Id. at 441. The plaintiff, a trained medical doctor, had not sought professional attention For
these symptoms as, in his professional judgment, nothing could be done medically to alleviate his
fears, His work as a doctor, teacher, and consultant necessitated air travel on about sixty Bights a
year. Id. at 440, 441.
'" Id, at 443. The Quill court reviewed state case law on emotional distress and noted a recent
case in which the state supreme court stated that a plaintiff must establish "physical symptoms" in
order to recover f in' defendant's negligence. Id. at 441-42 (quoting Langeland v. Farmers State
Bank, 319 N.W.2c1 26, 3 (Minn. 1982)).
'" Id. at 443 (citing Purcell v. St. Paul City Ky., 48 Minn. 134, 50 N.W. 1034 (1892)) (severe
stress experienced by pregnant passenger due to defendant's negligence in nearly causing collision
with another cable car caused plaintiff to miscarry); Okrina v, Midwestern Corp., 282 Minn. 400,
165 N.W.2d 259 (1969) (although plaintiff received no physical injuries when wall in defendant's
store collapsed, her fear that the whole building would collapse resulted in severe pain in her head,
back, and leg, required hospital care and brought about a change in her personality).
"9 Id. at 443 (quoting PRossaR & KEETON, supra note 8, § 54).
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of the claim," 139 and concluded that despite minimal physical consequences, the plaintiff's
recurring distress was genuine and warranted legal recognition. 190
In contrast to the New York and Minnesota holdings, the Hawaii Supreme Court
concluded, in Rodrigues v. State, that it is unnecessarily stringent to limit the guarantee
of genuineness test to simply an exception to the rule requiring resultant physical
injury."' The court found that the "better view" was to test all claims for emotional
distress pursuant to this stanclard. 12 Noting that one reason for the general rule requir-
ing physical injury was concern about fraudulent claims, the court expressed its confi-
dence that a court or jury's consideration of the specific claim's circumstances would
distinguish the spurious from the genuine."' Anticipating the criticism that such a test
122 Id. The court quoted with approval the opinion of the trial court in which the verdict of the
jury was upheld. Id.
14° Id. The court believed that the plaintiff established a prima facie case for negligent infliction
of emotional distress under the zone-of-danger test. Id.
Defendant TWA argued that the court should apply the standard of "severe emotional distress,"
recently adopted in Minnesota as a requirement for recovery for intentionally inflicted emotional
distress, to claims of mental distress resulting from negligence. Id. at 442. The Quill court indicated
that it doubted that the plaintiff could meet such a standard, especially in view of the state supreme
court's emphasis on the need to show receipt of medical treatment. Id. (citing Hubbard v. United
Press int'l, 330 N.W.2d 428 (Minn. 1983) and Langeland v. Farmers State Bank, 319 N.W.2d 26
(Minn, 1982)). The appellate court, however, was not persuaded that this standard was appropriate
for claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress, noting that the two torts had been treated
separately by the state courts for 90 years and that the state supreme court had given no indication
that such separation was to be abolished. Id. at 443. It is interesting to note, and it is indicative of
the confusion that exists regarding claims- for emotional distress, that, at least in Minnesota, a
plaintiff must plead and prove more severe resulting physical consequences when the defendant
intentionally caused emotional distress than when he or she did so merely negligently.
141
 Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 172. 472 P.2d 509, 519 (1970).
142 See id. at 171, 472 P.2d at 519, The plaintiffs in Rodrigues were homeowners who sought
recovery for flood damage to their new home. The flood allegedly resulted from the state highway
department's failure to drain surface water after a culvert became obstructed by sand and other
material. The plaintiffs were "heartbroken" upon discovering the extensive damage to the house
and furnishings. Id. at 159, 472 P.2d at 513. Although the trial court awarded damages for the
plaintiffs' mental distress, the state supreme court remanded the case for a determination of whether
the state breached any duty owed to the plaintiffs pursuant to the new standard formulated by the
court. Id. at 176, 472 P.2d at 522, The court noted that, despite a general rule against recovery for
mental distress, the interest in freedom from the negligent infliction of mental distress had in fact
received protection whenever the courts were persuaded that the dangers of fraudulent claims and
undue liability on the part of the defendant were outweighed by assurance of "genuine and serious"
mental distress. Id. at 170, 472 P.2d at 519 (citing W, PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS
55 (3d ed. 1964)). It then characterized parasitic damages, impact resulting in physical injury,
mishandling of corpse, and negligent transmission of death messages as all providing the necessary
assurance. Id. at 171, 472 P,2d at 519. The supreme court concluded that such "exceptions" should
not be used to restrict a plaintiff's right to recovery when the fact pattern did not fall within the
specific requirements of these approaches. Id. Instead, the situations above should simply serve as
examples of "trustworthy" claims, and that whenever the plaintiff's case presented guarantees of
genuineness, recovery should not be thwarted. Id.
' 43 1d. at 172, 472 P.2d at 519-20 (citation omitted). The court found the concern that fraud-
ulent claims would flood the courts held "little weight." Id. at 172, 472 P.2d at 519. It stated that
courts have competently administered claims for mental distress appended to independent causes
of action for many years. Id. The court also noted that many emotional distress claims would be
susceptible to medical proof, but even those claims not subject to medical evaluation could still be
judged by the court and jury by other proofs of genuineness. Id. at 172, 472 P.2d at 519-20.
September 1987]	 PRE-IMPACT EMOTIONAL DISTRESS	 903
would expose an actor to potentially unlimited liability for any mental disturbance, the
court determined that an actor's duty was to refrain only from the negligent infliction
of "serious" mental distress.' 44 The court stated, however, that the "seriousness" require-
ment means only that the "reasonable [person], normally constituted, would be unable
to adequately cope with the mental stress engendered by the circumstances of the case." 143
Thus, the Hawaii Supreme Court's definition is more a description of the circumstances
giving rise to the mental distress claim than a characterization of the extent or depth of
the distress which the plaintiff must suffer.'"
In Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, California similarly recognized a cause of
action for negligently inflicted emotional injury in the absence of physical consequences,
and found the defendant liable when the plaintiff was a direct victim of the defendant's
negligence as opposed to a percipient bystander-witness. 147 The California Supreme
Court determined that, in light of the underlying rationale for the physical manifestation
rule — to guard against false claims — the rule was both overinclusive and underinclu-
sive,'" The California court reasoned that the rule permitted recovery where trivial
'" Id. at 174, 472 P.2d at 520.
145 /d. at 173, 47'2 P.2d at 520. The defendant advanced several arguments to persuade the
court not to extend liability for mental distress beyond its then existing boundaries: (I) trivial mental
distress is "part and parcel" of community life; (2) social controls may better handle claims of
emotional distress than litigation; (3) some mental distress may actually be beneficial; and (4) an
especially sensitive person should not be coddled by penalizing those who serve the community. Id.
While the court recognized that these were legitimate concerns, the court felt that they were more
appropriately considered by the court and jury under a "reasonable person" test. Id. According to
the court, this test required that in any emotional distress claim, the plaintiff must establish the
elements of a cause of action for negligence, i.e., that the plaintiff was foresecably at risk from the
defendant's conduct, and that the defendant's negligence created the risk in the first place. Id. at
174, 472 P,2d at 521.
146 The Hawaii Supreme Court has extended Rodrigues to instances in which the plaintiff suffers
emotional distress as a result of witnessing a defendant's negligence injure another, so long as the
distress was foreseeable. See Leong v, 'l'akasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974). The Leong
court called the requirement that a witness sustain physical injury from the emotional distress
"another of the artificial devices to guarantee the genuineness of the claim, which may actually
foreclose relief to a serious claim." Id. at 404, 520 P.2d at 763. Thus, "Iwihere serious mental
distress to plaintiff was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of defendant's act, defendant's liability
could be imposed by the application of general tort principles." Id. at 408, 520 P.2d at 764-65
(quoting Rodrigues, 52 Hawaii at 174, 472 P.2d at 520).
Foreseeability, however, is an amorphous concept. The Hawaiian Supreme Court denied re-
covery to the estate of' a man who suffered a heart attack and died upon learning by telephone of
the deaths of his daughter and grandchild in an automobile accident in another state after con-
cluding that the decedent's distant location from the accident scene made his mental distress
unforeseeable. Kelley v. Kokua Sales & Supply Ltd., 56 Hawaii '204, 207, 532 P.2d 673, 676. More
important, the Kelley court retreated from its position in Rodrigues that requiring proof of serious
mental distress was a sufficient limit on the defendant's liability. Id.
17 Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
1" Id. at 929, 616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838. In Molien, the plaintiff's wife was advised
by a member of defendant hospital's staff that she had contracted syphilis. The hospital instructed
the wife to tell her husband, the plaintiff, of the diagnosis. The plaintiff was then forced to undergo
blood tests to ascertain whether he had contracted the disease and infected his wife. Although the
hospital ultimately discovered that the wife's diagnosis was erroneous, the plaintiff's wife accused
the plaintiff of infidelity and the ensuing hostility and tension resulted in the dissolution of the
marriage — all of which caused the plaintiff to experience emotional distress, albeit without physical
consequences. Id. at 919-20, 616 P.2d at 814-15, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 823-33,
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physical injury had occurred, yet denied a cause of action for potentially valid claims
unaccompanied by such manifestations.' 49 FUrthermore, the rule encouraged both ex-
travagant pleading and exaggerated testimony regarding the existence of physical symp-
toms)" The court also emphasized that the lack of a clear distinction between physical
and emotional harm made it difficult to predict how a court would. characterize a
particular injury.' 51 Therefore, the court held that reference to the "artificial and arbi-
trary" factor of resultant physical manifestations would no longer decide the issue of
whether the direct victim in fact suffered compensable emotional distress. 152 Instead, the
trier of fact was to resolve the claim on the basis of the proof introduced at trial, so long
as such proof included a "guarantee of genuineness in the circumstances of the case." 15'
149 1d. at 928, 616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838. The court also reasoned that the physical
manifestation rule failed to satisfy the concerns of those fearing that claims for emotional distress
would open the floodgates of litigation, as it noted that the slightest physical injury became the
claimant's ticket for admission to the courthouse. Id.
,5° Id. at 929, 616 1'.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838. The court noted that other observers
urged compensation for serious emotional distress because "otherwise the tendency would be for
the victim to exaggerate symptoms of sick headaches, nausea, insomnia, etc., to make out a technical
basis of bodily injury, upon which to predicate a parasitic recovery for the more grievous disturb-
ance, the mental and emotional distress ... endured." Id. at 929, 616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr.
at 838 (quoting Magruder, supra note 31, at 1059).
is' Id. at 929-30, 616 l',2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839. The court noted that even the
Restatement had difficulty distinguishing between "mere" emotional disturbance which resulted in
dizziness or nausea, and prolonged bouts with both which constitutes bodily harm. Id. at 929, 616
P.2d at 820-21, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838-39. The court also discussed an early California decision in
which the court considered whether a plaintiff's nervous disorder constituted a physical or mental
injury. Id. al 929, 616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838. That early case was Sloane v. Southern
Cal. Ry., I I 1 Cal. 668, 44 P. 320 (1896). The Sloane court stated:
It is a matter of general knowledge that an attack of sudden fright or an exposure to
imminent peril has produced in individuals a complete change in their nervous sys-
tems, and rendered one who was physically strong and vigorous weak and timid. Such
a result must be regarded as an injury to the body rather than to the mind ... .
Id. at 680, 44 P. at 322. The Molien court interpreted this passage to mean that mental disturbance
could be classified as either psychological or physical injury, but not both. The court also noted that
this belief persisted in the law despite advances in medical science which suggested that the dis-
tinction was no longer valid. Molien, 27 Cal, 3d at 929, 616 P.2d at 817-18, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838.'
152 The Mullen court stated that "emotional injury may be fully as severe and debilitating as
physical harm, and is no less deserving of redress ...." 27 Cal. 3d at 919, 616 P.2d at 814, 167
Cal. Rptr. at 832.
1" Id. at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839 (citation omitted). The court recognized
that emotional injury occasionally is "susceptible of objective ascertainment by expert medical
testimony ... ." Id. The court agreed, however, with the approach advocated by the Hawaii Supreme
Court in Rodrigues that the circumstances giving rise to the alleged mental distress could also provide
evidence of the claim's genuineness. Id. at 928, 616 P.2d at 819-20, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 837-38. The
court noted that in a prior case involving recovery for intentionally inflicted mental injury, it had
rejected the principle that physical injury is necessary to ensure that serious mental distress actually
occurred, and concluded that the jurors could best decide the existence and extent of the emotional
distress based on their own experience. Id. at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839 (citing
State Rubbish Ass'n v. Silizinoff. 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952)). The Molien court indicated
that the facts of the case at bar created a foreseeable risk of serious emotional distress to the plaintiff
and thus served as a "measure of the validity of plaintiff's claim for emotional distress." Id. at 930,
616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr, at 839. A further factor supporting plaintiff's claim that the court
found persuasive of its genuineness was the fact that the false imputation of venereal disease was
slander per se al common law. Id. See also La Fleur by Blackey v. Mosher, 109 Wis. 2d 112, 119, 325
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The court imposed two limitations on the newly-recognized cause of action. First, it
applied only to claims brought by direct victims of a defendant's negligence; courts
would still decide percipient witness's claims under the Dillon test. 154 Second, as in Hawaii,
the court determined that the defendant's duty is only to avoid exposing a plaintiff to a
risk of serious emotional distress.'" As these cases demonstrate, the common law of
some jurisdictions has evolved to the point that the notion that a defendant may be liable
for negligently causing emotional harm, alone, is no longer considered reyolutionary. 156
N.W.2d 314, 317 (1982) (court held that in appropriate circumstances tort or negligent confinement
"by its very nature has special likelihood of causing real and severe emotional distress").
' 54 Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 922-23, 616 P.2d at 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834. The defendant claimed
that the plaintiff was only a bystander witness to the defendant's negligent action against the direct
victim, the plaintiff's wife; therefore, any claim for emotional injury had to be tested against the
Dillon foreseeability factors. See supra note 99. The defendant further contended that because the
plaintiff was not present when his wife was informed of the erroneous venereal disease diagnosis,
his cause of action did not satisfy the Dillon requirement of proximity to the incident. The court,
however, concluded that the plaintiff was a direct victim of the defendant's negligence, reasoning
that the nature of the disease made it "rational to anticipate that both husband and wife would
experience anxiety, suspicion and hostility" when informed of the diagnosis. Id. at 923, 616 P.2d at
817, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 835, Thus, the court found that because the risk of emotional harm to the
plaintiff was foreseeable, the defendant, through its conduct, breached a duty to both the husband
and the wife. Id.
Using the foreseeability requirement to distinguish between direct victims and peripheral
witnesses for the purpose of limiting recovery for emotional distress has generated some controversy
among commentators. See Nolan & Ursin, supra note 94, at 603-04 (court creates potentially
enormous class of plaintiff's); Comment, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: New Horizons After
Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 13 PAC. 1.4. 179, 189-95 (1981); Comment, Negligent
Infliction of Emotional Distress as an Independent Cause of Action in California: Do Defendants Face Unlimited
Liability?, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 181, 193-95 (1982) ("unqualified use of foreseeability of the risk
is a difficult standard to apply and even harder to limit ... ").
1 " Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 1137 Cal. Rptr. at 839, By restricting recovery to
cases of serious emotional distress, the court sought to limit defendant's liability for trivial and
transient invasions of mental tranquility. The court adopted the Hawaii Supreme Court's definition
of serious emotional distress. This requirement refers not to the extent of the emotional damage
but to the characterization of the situation giving rise to the distress. Id. at 927-28, 616 P.2d at
819-20, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 837-38. The California courts, however, have declined to follow Hawaii's
lead and apply the "genuineness or the circumstances" test to cases where a bystander suffers the
emotional distress. Such claims, in California, continue to be tested under the Dillon "foreseeability"
approach. Cf, supra notes 146, 154 and accompanying text,
"" Other jurisdictions continue to move away from the impact and zone-of-danger rules toward
recognizing a separate duty to avoid inflicting emotional distress. In Schultz v. Barberton Glass Co.,
4 Ohio St. 3d 131, 447 N.E.2d 109 (1983), the Ohio Supreme Court rejected both rules, reasoning,
like the California Supreme Court, that the rationales underlying the rules did not justify their
adoption. First, the court rejected the idea that allowing emotional distress claims would lead to a
flood of litigation, citing no evidence that this had occurred in jurisdictions without an impact
requirement. Id, at 133, 447 N.E.2d at W. The court concluded, however, that even if litigation
increased, this was not a valid reason to deny recovery in meritorious actions. Id. Second, the court
rejected the physical injury requirement as a filter •for screening fraudulent claims, noting that the
danger of false claims exists wherever slight physical injury provides a sufficient basis for a cause
of action. Id. at 135, 447 N.E.2d at 111-12. Finally, the court remained unpersuaded that emotional
distress awards would be based on conjecture or speculation in the absence of physical injury. Id.
at 135, 447 N.E.2d at 112, Instead, the court expressed confidence in the ability of the judicial
process to evaluate such claims, and recognized that, as a practical matter, the complainant would
often use medical testimony to establish his or her case. Id. at 135, 447 N.E.2d at 112. See also Paugh
v. Hanks, 6 Ohio St. 3d 72, 80, 451 N.E.2d 759, 767 (1983) (cause of action for negligent infliction
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Louisiana courts have avoided both the impact and the zone-of-danger rules by
holding that a plaintiff may recover for fright, fear or mental anguish experienced while
an ordeal is in progress.'" The courts treat this type of emotional distress as an inde-
pendent element of damages, separate from any physical injury or emotional distress
manifested after the incident.'" One court, explaining its rejection of the physical injury
or manifestation requirement, acknowledged the "legitimate fear" that plaintiff might
file fake or frivolous claims for emotional distress alone.'" It concluded, however, that
requiring a plaintiff to prove emotional distress by a preponderance of the evidence
made the risk of frivolous suits no more likely than the risk inherent in any physical
injury claim. 160 The court's refusal to deny compensation for purely emotional harm is
in keeping with the dictates of the Louisiana Civil Code, which requires that one at fault
for causing damage compensate the injured party.isi
III. How PRE-IMPACT DISTRESS CLAIMS HAVE FARED IN THE COURTS
In a spate of recent cases, plaintiffs have sought recovery for the emotional distress
experienced by one after realizing that a defendant's negligence has placed hint or her
of emotional distress can be maintained absent resulting physical injury, but medical testimony is
admissible as evidence of degree of emotional distress suffered); Taylor v. 13aptist Medical Center,
Inc., 400 So. 2d 369, 374 (Ala. 1981) ("to continue to require physical injury caused by culpable
tortious conduct, when mental suffering may be equally recognizable standing alone, would be an
adherence to procrustean principles which have little or no resemblance to medical realities");
Vance v, Vance, 41 Md. App. 130, 138, 396 A.2d 296, 301 (1979). The Vance court stated:
We believe it is time that courts unbind themselves from the outmoded belief that
there can be no injury to the mind without overt manifestations of bodily harm. We
should recognize what the health professionals already know, that the psyche is as
susceptible of injury as the body, and that the absence of apparent physical damage
does not serve to lessen the extent of the mental injury.
Id. (footnote and citations omitted).
157 See, e.g., Dawson v. James H. Stuart & Deaton, Inc., 437 So. 2d 974 (La. Ct. App. 1983);
Butler v. Pardue, 415 So. 2d 249 (La. Ct. App. 1982); Hoffman v. All Star Ins. Corp., 288 So. 2d
388 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 290 So. 2d 909 (La. 1974).
Similarly, Louisiana courts permit recovery fOr emotional distress arising after the precipitating
incident has ended without proof of physical injury or proof that the plaintiff was within the zone
of physical danger. Chappetta v. Bowman Tramp., Inc., 415 So. 2d 1019 (La. Ct. App. 1982).
For a discussion of Louisiana law regarding negligent infliction of emotional distress, see generally
Comment, Mental Anguish — The Law of Compensation in Louisiana, 31 LOY. L. REV. 965, 969-72
(1986).
158
 For example, in Dawson the plaintiff was injured in a collision between defendant's tractor
trailer and his own. The court awarded damages for the pain he suffered as a result of his physical
injury, the terror he experienced during the incident when he believed he would die, and the
emotional distress he suffered after the accident. Dawson, 437 So. 2d at 976.
' 59 Chappetta, 415 So. 2d at 1022. The defendant's tractor trailer collided with the plaintiff's
car, causing property damage but no physical injury to plaintiff. Id. at 1020. While still at the
accident scene, the plaintiff became hysterical and afterwards suffered headaches and nightmares.
Id. at 1020, 1022. Her doctor diagnosed her condition as acute severe anxiety complex arising from
the accident. Id, at 1020. On appeal, the defendants contended that recovery for such distress was
unavailable because it did riot cause any bodily injury or illness. Id. at 1022.
i" Id. at 1022. The Chappetta court characterized the real problem as one of proving emotional
injury in the absence of physiCal manifestations, but concluded that where the plaintiff could meet
her burden, no distinction would be made between claims for damages due to physical injury and
those fur emotional injury only. Id.
161 "Every act whatever, of man that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it
happened to repair it." LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (West Supp. 1987).
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in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm.'" Claims for "pre-impact" distress
have faced not only the traditional judicial reluctance to protect emotional tranquility,'"
but also evidentiary problems peculiar to the circumstances which give rise to the claim.'"
In those jurisdictions where actions for pre-impact distress have been recognized as
viable, however, compensation can be significant for the relatively short duration of the
mental stress.m
The following section focuses on how pre-impact distress claims have fared in those
jurisdictions which have addressed the issue.'" Courts have considered these cases under
both traditional approaches to mental distress claims' 67 and tests invoked only for this
specific type of mental distress.'" In order to provide a foundation for the critical analysis
in the next section, this section examines, in detail, the rationale advanced by these
courts.'"9
1" See infra notes 170-288 and accompanying text.
145 For a discussion of judicial reluctance to recognize a protectable interest in one's mental
tranquility, see supra notes 31-161 and accompanying text.
164 One commentator has concluded that one reason more pre-impact cases have not surfaced
is the difficulty of proving the cause of action. Fuchsberg, supra note 19, at 33. Fuchsberg notes
that in "pre-impact" cases, the nature of the case itself often deprives the fact finder of direct
evidence:
Death has sealed the lips of the victim. Often there are no survivors. Thus, there will
be no direct. evidence of the decedent's pain and suffering, with no direct evidence of
awareness of the danger, or that the danger was perceived as so extreme that it would
cause apprehension of impending death.
Id. Thus, the plaintiff is forced to rely on circumstantial evidence, evidence that the defendant will
argue is too minimal to warrant recovery. Id. Compare Shu-Tao Lin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
742 F.2d 45 (2d Cir, 1984) (court permitted recovery for pre-impact distress on evidence that
decedent was assigned a window seat on side of plane from which engine piece broke away, or
from fact that sudden change in plane's altitude would have made him aware of risk) and Malacynski
v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 565 F. Supp. 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (court denied defendant's motion
to dismiss, stating that a trial can best determine whether plaintiff's evidence, eyewitnesses to crash,
documents filed with the National Transportation Safety Board and decedent's seat assignment,
support inference of decedent's fear) with Shatkin v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 727 F.2d 202 (2d
Cir. 1984) (in action arising out of same plane crash as Lin, court found evidence that decedent
was seated on right side of plane which lost engine pieces from left side insufficient to support
inference of pre-impact distress) and Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 1271, 1300-
01 (D. Conn, 1974) (court found one survivor's testimony that he was aware of impending crash
provided no evidence to support inference that decedent passenger was similarly aware).
While recognizing that problems of proof are of major significance to the litigants, this Article
focuses on the issue of the standard that should be used to determine whether such claims should
be recognized and not what proof' will be considered sufficient to meet the standard.
" Lin, 742 F.2d 45 (affirming $10,000 award for decedent's pre-impact fear on flight which
lasted total of 30 seconds); Solomon v. Warren, 540 F.2d 777, 792 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed sub
nom., Warren v. Serody, 434 U.S. 801 (1977) (awarding $10,000 to estates of two deceased passengers
for stress suffered prior to plane crash despite no evidence as to length of time decedents were
aware of the impending disaster); Furumizo v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 981 (D. Hawaii 1965),
aff 'd , 381 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1967) (awarding $15,000 for decedent's pain and suffering during
brief descent of plane which crashed and burned decedent to death); Green v. Hale, 590 S.W.2d
231 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (awarding $5,000 for 13-year-old boy's mental anguish as defendant
negligently backed his truck over him).
' 66 See infra notes 170-288.
1u7
	 infra cases cited at notes 165-84, 193-213, 240-49, 266-73 and accompanying text.
'" See infra cases cited at notes 214-36, 248-65, and 274-88 and accompanying text.
149 See infra notes 289-349 and accompanying text.
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A. Pre-Impact Distress in the Impact Jurisdictions
The impact rule, as previously discussed, requires that before the plaintiff may
recover damages for mental distress, he or she must demonstrate some physical con-
tact." The two impact jurisdiction courts that have considered whether claims for pre-
impact distress are compatible with this approach have reached opposing conclusions.'"
In Solomon v. Warren, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered
whether Florida recognized a cause of action for pre-impact emotional distress.'" The
appellate court upheld a $10,000 award to the estates of two passengers in a small plane
that disappeared and was presumably lost at sea, despite the lack of any evidence
concerning the passengers' distress.'" The Fifth Circuit concluded that it was unable to
discover any reason in "law or logic" why a jurisdiction which permitted recovery for
post-impact mental anguish would preclude recovery when the sequence was reversed.'"
Instead, the court reasoned that mental injury accompanied by physical impact satisfied
the rule. 175
The dissenting judge in Solomon vigorously disagreed that sequence was irrelevant
under the impact rule."° He asserted that causation was the rationale for the rule,
observing that the decedents would have experienced the same mental anguish had the
pilot been able to avoid the crash at the last moment, but these injuries would not have
been compensable under the impact rule.'" Because impact, in his view, served as the
170 For a discussion of the impact rule, see supra notes 59-74 and accompanying text.
n cf infra notes 172-75, 180-84 and accompanying text.
' 72
 540 F.2d 777 (5th Gir. 1976).
'" Id. at 792-93. Plaintiffs brought an action against the deceased pilot's estate and his insurer
under the Death on the High Seas Act and the Florida Survival Act for the deaths of the two
passengers, who were survived by three minor children, and also for the passengers' mental
suffering before their deaths. The district court, after trial without a jury, found the pilot's negli-
gence a cause of the passengers' deaths. The plaintiffs introduced into evidence a transcript of the
radio contact between the pilot and an air traffic control station, in which the pilot stated that the
fuel gauge was on empty and that he would attempt to ditch the aircraft near a merchant vessel.
Despite the absence of any evidence that the decedents knew of their plight or the duration of their
knowledge, the trial court awarded pre-impact damages, stating:
[This court is] convinced that both of the deceased knew of the impending crash
landing at sea, knew of the immediate dangers involved and are certain to have
experienced the most excruciating type of pain and suffering (the knowledge that one
is about to die, leaving three cherished children alone).
Id. at 792. The court affirmed the $10,000 awards, stating that it considered this amount "on the
very low side." Id. at 793.
1741d. The court noted that in typical claims brought under a survival act, damages for pain
and suffering are usually awarded for the period during which the victim was conscious prior to
death, but it saw no reason not to allow recovery in the situation at bar. Id. at n.21.
'" Id. While recognizing that Florida courts embraced the impact rule, the court concluded
that, in effect, the Florida precedent provided that "no recovery can be had for mental pain and
suffering unaccompanied by any physical impact." Id. (emphasis in original).
170 Id. at 796-97 (Gee, J., dissenting).
I" Id. at 796-97. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Gee argued that Florida law compensated
only mental suffering "occasioned" by physical trauma, when impact provides a "but for" cause of
any mental suffering. Id. Judge Cee also noted the absence of any cases directly on point and
concluded that because Florida law was "unsettled," the Fifth Circuit should have certified the
question For resolution by the Florida courts. Id. at 797.
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causal link that proved the mental pain, reversing the sequence undermined the rule's
rationale.'" In his opinion, any damages award for mental distress experienced prior to
impact is based on nothing more than "sheer speculation."'"
Although Illinois recently adopted the zone-of-danger test,'" a pre-impact distress
claim did not fare well under its former approach, the impact rule. In In re Air Crash
Disaster Near Chicago, Illinois on May 25, 1979,m the District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, applying Illinois law, granted the defendant's motion to strike the
plaintiff's claims for emotional distress suffered prior to impact.'" Rejecting the plain-
tiff's argument that the court should extend emotional distress recovery to include the
time period immediately preceding an inevitable physical injury,'" the court stated that
Illinois law allowed recovery for emotional distress only when actual physical impact
caused the distress.'"
1" Id.
09 Id. Stating that the approach favored by the majority "open's] the dour to 	 uncertainties,"
id., Judge Gee described affirming the award for pre-impact distress in this case "presumptuous."
Id. Without evidence about what actually occurred before the plane crashed, the dissenting judge
appeared uncomfortable with inferring pre-impact distress.
' 8 " See infra note 191 and accompanying text. •
L81 507 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Ill, 1980), rev'd on reconsideration, 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,215 (N.D. Ill.
1983). This case involved a wrongful death and survival action brought by the mother of one of
the passengers killed in the May 25, 1979 plane crash. Id. The plaintiff also sought damages for
any terror or fright the decedent experienced as the plane began its final "roll" toward the ground.
Id,
182 In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, 507 F. Supp. at 24. In its original decision to dismiss
the claim fur pre-impact distress, the court held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover for her
daughter's pain and suffering endured after the crash but before her death despite the defendant's
claim that the interval for any such pain was so short as to preclude recovery as a matter of law.
Id. The court also rejected the defendant's contention that the plaintiff's products liability theory
provided no basis for pain and suffering recovery. Id. at 24-25.
185 Id. at 23-24. The plaintiff, recognizing that Illinois was an "impact" jurisdiction, argued
that so long as impact occurred, it was irrelevant whether the distress preceded impact; thus,
recovery for pre-impact distress was compatible with the impact rule. Id. at 23. The plaintiff relied
on Solomon v. Warren, which had allowed such damages in an impact jurisdiction. Id. at 23-24
(discussing Solomon v. Warren, 540 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed sub num., Warren v.
Serody, 439 U.S. 801 (1977)). The district court was unpersuaded, however, citing Judge Gee's
conclusion in his Solomon dissent that only those fears actually caused by impact are compensable
in an impact jurisdiction. Id, at 24 (citing Solomon, 540 F.2d at 797 (Gee, J., dissenting)).
154 Id. at 23. The district court noted that where a defendant's negligence caused fear but not
physical injury, recovery was -denied under the impact approach. Id. The district court, however,
erred in concluding that physical injury was a prerequisite to recovery for emotional distress. The
cases on which the court relied may be read to reach a different conclusion. For instance, in
Carlinville National Bank v. Rhoads, the court stated that Illinois had long adhered to the view that
"no liability exists for negligent acts which occasion fright or terror where there has been no
accompanying physical impact, even if nervous shock, which constitutes a physical injury, follows." 63 Ill.
App. '3c1 502, 503, 380 N.E.2d 63, 65 (1978) (emphasis added), In that case, the plaintiff, the widow
of a man struck and killed by defendant's truck, sought damages for emotional distress suffered
after she witnessed the collision. Id. at 502, 380 N.E.2d at 64. In Rosenberg v. Packerland Packing Co.,
the court denied recovery for emotional distress suffered by the driver and passengers in a car
tailgated by defendant's truck at a speed between 70 and 80 miles per hour over a "long span of
time," because the plaintiffs did not alledge any impact between the vehicles or with the plaintiffs'
persons. 55 Ill. App. 3d 959, 961-62, 370 N.E.2d 1235, 1237-38. Similarly, in Benza v. Schulman
Air Freight, the court declined an invitation to allow recovery for emotional distress which resulted
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B. Pre-Impact Distress in the Zone-of-Danger Jurisdictions
The zone-of-danger rule conditions recovery on two elements: the defendant must
negligently place the victim in peril of physical harm or death, and the victim's resulting
emotional distress must manifest itself in physical symptoms.'" While some courts have
recognized exceptions, most courts continue to demand objective symptoms of distress
as a guarantee of the claim's merit." Some courts in zone-of-danger jurisdictions which
have addressed the issue of pre-impact distress have allowed any physical change ex-
perienced by the victim to suffice." 7 Where, however, the plaintiff could not demonstrate
any physical manifestation of distress, other courts have dismissed the claims.'" Still
other courts have permitted recovery for emotional distress by analyzing the claims
under precedent dealing with damages for pain and suffering, rather than for emotional
distress."9
The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois initially rejected a pre-impact
distress claim, concluding that the state's "impact rule" precluded such recovery."* Three
years after this decision, however, the Illinois Supreme Court, in Rickey v. Chicago Transit
Authority, abandoned the impact rule and adopted the zone-of-danger test."' The Rickey
court stated that its decision would give a bystander a cause of action for "physical injury
or illness" suffered as a result of experiencing emotional distress. 192 In light of the
in physical injury even in the absence of impact, preferring to adhere to the impact rule. 46 Ill.
App. 3d 521, 525, 361 N.E.2d 91, 93 (1977).
Thus, it appears that the district court in In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago was mistaken in
holding that Illinois plaintiffs could recover only for emotional distress caused by a physical injury.
Nevertheless, although the court improperly stated the Illinois rule, it correctly used the impact
rule in reaching its conclusion.
'" See supra notes 87-120 arid accompanying text.
' 86 Compare infra notes 237-47 and accompanying text with notes 190-213 and 227-36 and
accompanying text.
'" See infra notes 190-97 and accompanying text.
I" See infra notes 198-213 and accompanying text,
In See infra notes 214-26 and accompanying text.
' 90 See discussion of In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago under the impact rule, supra notes
181-84 and accompanying text.
191 Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 98 III. 2d 546, 457 N.E.2d 1 (1983). In Rickey, an older
brother witnessed his younger brother's strangulation when the boy's clothing became tangled in
an escalator. Id. at 548, 457 N,E.2d at I. The older sibling later experienced serious emotional
damage, including extreme depression and prolonged mental disturbance. Id. at 549-50, 457
N.E.2d at 2. Under the impact rule, a bystander's recovery would have been precluded. See id. at
553, 457 N.E.2d at 4. Noting that the impact rule barred legitimate claims from being heard, the
Illinois Supreme Court held that a bystander could recover if he or she were within the zone-of-
danger created by the defendant's negligence, was concerned for his or her own safety, and could
show physical injury resulting from that mental distress. Id. at 555-56, 457 N.E.2d at 5.
It is important to note that the Rickey court explicitly declined to adopt an approach, like that
in Molien v. Kaiser. Foundation Hospital, which would have allowed recovery for emotional distress
alone, stating that the standard was "too vaguely defined to apply ... and one that is excessively
broad." Id. at 554, 457 N.E.2d at 4. In so doing, the Rickey court required some showing that
physical injury resulted from the mental distress.
191 Id. at 555, 457 N.E.2d at 5. Although the court stated that the Rickey plaintiff had met this
standard by pleading "physical manifestations," id. at 556, 457 N.E.2d at 5, those physical manifes-
tations included "definite functional, emotional, psychiatric and behavioral disorders, extreme
depression, prolonged and continuing mental disturbances, inability to attend school and engage
in gainful employment and to engage in his usual and customary affairs." Id. at 449-50, 457 N.E.2d
at 2.
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change in Illinois law, the Air Crash plaintiffs asked the district court to reconsider its
earlier refusal to recognize pre-impact emotional distress claims)" On reconsideration,
the court held that the Illinois Supreme Court's adoption of the zone-of-danger test
permitted recovery for pre-impact emotional distress by plaintiffs who could show phys-
ical manifestations of their emotional distress.'" Although the court rejected the defen-
dant's contention that the short duration of any pre-impact distress precluded recovery
as a matter of law,'" it also disagreed with the plaintiffs' assertion that physical mani-
festations were unnecessary where the plaintiff's decedent suffered a direct physical
injury. 196 The district court concluded that if the plaintiffs could prove the alleged
physical symptoms — "increased heart rate, sweating, pupil dilation, bladder and bowel
incontinence, muscular tremors, increased respiration, restgiction of coronary arteries,
hyperirritability of the nervous system and shock" — they could recover damages for
pre-impact distress.'"
In another zone-of-danger jurisdiction, inability to prove resulting physical mani-
festations was fatal to the plaintiff's cause of action for pre-impact distress.'" According
to the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Nye v. Cammonwealth, 199 that jurisdiction's rule
193 In re Air Grath Disaster Near Chicago, 507 F. Su pp. at 21.
In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, 18 Av. Gas. (CCH) 17,215, 17,217 (1983). The court
permitted the plaintiffs to amend their complaints to allow such damages as follows: "As a proximate
result of his or her reasonable fear for his/her own safety, plaintiff's decedent, suffered
fright, terror, emotional distress and physical pain and emotional suffering during the 30 seconds
of the flight and until the moment of his/her death following impact with the ground." Id.
195 Id. The court noted that the defendant's argument with respect to the duration of the
emotional injury was directly analogous to that presented to, and rejected by, the district court in
its ruling on post-impact pain and suffering. Id. The court held that the "necessarily short duration"
of the passengers' emotional distress would not preclude recovery for an otherwise compensable
loss. Id.
196 Id. The plaintiffs argued that the Illinois Supreme Court's concern in Rickey, that physical
manifestations were necessary to prevent an onslaught of frivolous claims, was not implicated in
cases where the plaintiff suffered a direct physical injury. Id. The court, nevertheless, concluded
that Rickey would allow compensation only for emotional distress that produced physical manifes-
tations. Id.
1" Id.
198 Nye v. Commonwealth, 331 Pa. Super. 209, 480 A.2d 318 (1984).
199 Id. The plaintiff, the father and husband of the decedents, brought wrongful death and
survival actions against the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation and the driver of the vehicle
that forced the decedent's car off the road. Id. at 211, 480 A.2d at 320. The plaintiff did not
introduce any evidence that the decedents were conscious during the period between injury and
death, but the trial court instructed the jury that it could award damages for the pain and suffering
the decedent experienced during this period. Id. at 213, 480 A.2d at 321. The court, however,
rejected a proposed jury charge for damages for pre-impact fright. Id. at 213 n.3, 480 A.2d at 321
n.3. After the jury returned with an award of approximately $75,000 for the decedent's pain and
suffering, the court ordered a new trial. Id. at 213, 480 A.2d at 320. On appeal, the plaintiff argued
that the verdict for pain and suffering should stand because the jury believed that the decedent
suffered emotional distress as she attempted to bring her car back under control. Id. at 215, 480
A.2t1 at 321. The court cited a prior case which held that in survival actions in Pennsylvania, "the
measure of damages is the decedent's pain and suffering and loss of gross earning power from the
date of injury until death ...." Id. at 215, 480 A.2d at 321 (quoting Slaseman v. Myers, 300 Pa.
Super. 537, 544-45, 455 A.2d 1213, 1217 (1983)) (emphasis in original). The court noted the lack
of precedent for an award for pre-impact fright in Pennsylvania, and stated "we have always limited
recovery to damages for pain and suffering and emotional distress occurring after the time of
injury." Id. at 215, 480 A.2d at 321 (emphasis in original).
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governing recovery for negligently inflicted emotional distress required resultant physical
harm. 200
 Although noting the lack of precedent supporting recovery for pre-impact
fright,2°' the Nye court maintained that even if such fright were compensable, the court
would require proof that the decedent suffered physical harm as a result of his or her
fear of impending death. 202 Thus, the court affirmed dismissal of the claim despite
testimony by witnesses that, after the defendant driver recklessly forced the decedent's
vehicle off the road into a median barrier, the decedent driver unsuccessfully struggled
to bring the car back under control before it crashed into an oncoming vehicle. 2°'
A plaintiff's claim for pre-impact distress met a similar fate in Kansas, another
jurisdiction that follows the zone-of-danger test 4°4 In Fogarty v. Campbell 66 Express, Inc.,
the plaintiffs' failure to delponstrate that their decedent's emotional distress was mani-
fested in physical symptoms prior to his death caused the United States District Court
for the District of Kansas to direct a verdict for the defendant on the pre-impact distress
claim. 205 In Fogarty, the court reviewed Kansas case law concerning recovery for emo-
21° /d. (citing Banyas v. Lower Bucks Hosp., 293 Pa. Super. 122, 437 A.2d 1236 (1981)). It
should be noted, however, that the Nye court ignored a line of cases that suggest that physical
manifestations are not necessary. In the 1979 decision of Sinn v, Bird, 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672
(1979), a plurality of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a mother who saw her child struck
and killed due to defendant's negligent driving would have a cause of action for her resulting
emotional distress, even though the mother was outside the zone of physical danger. Although the
plaintiff apparently alleged physical injury due to the distress, the plurality called the physical injury
requirement "another synthetic device to guarantee the genuineness of the claim," and concluded
that advancements in modern science, when combined with the fact finder's ability to discern
between valid and fraudulent claims, made such a requirement unnecessary. Id. at 160-61, 404
A.2d at 679-80. Cases decided after Sinn, however, have revealed confusion among the Pennsylvania
appellate courts as to whether resulting physical symptoms are still necessary for a viable cause of
action for negligently inflicted emotional distress. Compare Scott v. Kopp, 494 Pa. 487, 490 n.2, 431
A.2d 959, 961 n.2 (1981) (Sinn allows recovery for emotional distress even in absence of physical
injury) with Tackett v. Encke, 353 Pa. Super. 349, 350 n.1, 509 A.2d 1310, 1312 n.l (1986) (bodily
harm required), and Cathcart v. Keene Indus. Insulation, 324 Pa. Super. 123, 151-52, 471 A.2d
493, 508 (1984) (relying on RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436 A, court requires physical
manifestations) and Banyas v. Lower Bucks Hosp., 293 Pa. Super. 122, 129, 437 A.2d 1236, 1239-
40 (1981) (physical symptoms required). See also Commonwealth v. Balisteri, 329 Pa. Super. 148,
154 n.7, 478 A. 2d 5, 8 n.7 (1984) (noting inconsistency between Sinn and subsequent cases).
20' Pa. Super. at 215, 480 A.2d at 321. The court stated that "we have always limited
recovery to damages for pain and suffering and emotional distress occurring after the time of
injury." Id. (emphasis in original).
5" Id. at 215-16, 480 A.2d at 321.
203 1d. at 214, 480 A.2d at 320.
2M See infra note 206.
2°5
	 v. Campbell 66 Express, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 953 (D. Kan. 1986). The plaintiff's
husband was killed while driving one of two tractor-trailers that collided at an intersection where
the defendant driver, a Campbell 66 Express employee, allegedly ignored a stop sign. Id. at 955.
After the collision, the decedent's truck crashed through a six-foot concrete wall. Id. The decedent
was killed when the load of steel he was hauling came through the cab, crushing his head and
thorax. Id. The defendants asserted that the plaintiff's claim for pre-impact emotional distress was
not cognizable under Kansas law. See id. at 957. The plaintiff, however, not only claimed that the
defendant's conduct was negligent, but alternatively claimed that the defendant driver's conduct
was wanton (i.e., reckless). Id. at 956. Because Kansas law did not require proof of physical symptoms
for emotional distress resulting from wanton conduct, the court denied the defendant's motion for
partial summary judgment. Id.
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tional distress, 206 as well as decisions in other jurisdictions which addressed the issue. 207
It found no persuasive precedent permitting recovery for negligently induced emotional
distress absent physical manifestations in a jurisdiction which had long adhered to the
zone-of-danger test. 208 The court, however, expressly refrained from endorsing the
"resulting physical injury" component of the zone-of-danger test, 209 noting that this
requirement had developed as a response to concerns that plaintiffs could easily feign
emotional distress before advances in medical science made the requirement "unjust,
illogical and unenlightened." 210 The court instead proposed a rule that imposed liability
•
208 The court initially determined that the Kansas rule regarding recovery fur emotional distress
was "functionally equivalent" to the "zone of danger" rule with its requisite resultant physical
symptoms language. Id. at 957-58. Although recognizing that some of the reasons for the rule —
preventing trivial claims, providing a guarantee of genuineness against claims otherwise easily
feigned, and guarding against liability out of proportion to mere negligent conduct — may now be
obsolete, the court concluded that the Kansas Supreme Court would move away from the rule only
if it were convinced that these reasons were no longer valid. Id. at 958.
"7 Id. at 958-61. The court noted that five states and the Federal Employer's Liability Act
(FELA) seemed to permit such a claim even in the absence of physical symptoms. Id. at 957. The
court immediately rejected the reasoning supporting the Louisiana and FELA decisions on the
ground that they were based on cunirolling statutes which reflected especially "broad compensatory
principle[s]" that did not exist in Kansas law. Id. at 958. The court also found unpersuasive
suggestions by Connecticut and New York courts that mental distress alone was compensable,
finding no judicial analysis of why such a rule should prevail in the face of the concerns articulated
in the Restatement as reasons For requiring physical symptoms. Id. at 959. It further attacked Platt
v. McDonnell-Douglas Corti., 554 F. Supp. 360 Mich. 1983), where the federal district court
determined that Michigan law would permit recovery for pre-impact fright alone, finding that the
state's case law was consistent with the rule permitting recovery only where the emotional distress
accompanied physical injury. Fogarty, 640 F. Supp. at 960. Finally, the court found that the Fifth
Circuit's award of such damages in Solomon v, Warren, 540 F.2d 777 (5th Cir, 1976), cert. denied
sub nom. Warren v. SerOdy, 434 U.S. 801 (1978), did not apply, as Solomon was decided under the
impact rule and Kansas was a zone-of-danger jurisdiction. Fogarty, 640 F. Supp. at 960-61. Thus,
the Fogarty court concluded that "no court ... has cogently explained why the Restatement factors
ought now to be discounted." Id. at 961-62.
208 Id. at 962. As recently as 1983 the Kansas Supreme Court had reiterated the requirement
that negligently induced emotional distress must be accompanied by or result in physical injury.
Hoard v. Shawnee Mission Medical Center, 233 Kan. 267,662 P.2d 1214 (1983). The Fogarty court
also found support for its interpretation of Kansas law in that state's "stringent" attitude toward
claims involving intentional infliction of emotional distress. Fogarty, 640 F. Supp. at 962. Kansas law
permits recovery for this tort only when the defendant's conduct is found "outrageous to the point
that it goes beyond the bounds of decency and is utterly intolerable in a civilized society." Id.
(quoting Roberts v. Saylor, 230 Kan. 289,293,637 P.2d 1175,1179 (1981)). The court concluded
that to recognize a claim for negligently inflicted emotional distress without resulting physical
consequences "would fly in the face" of Kansas' restrictive approach to claims for damages due to
intentional conduct. Id.
v°9 Fogarty, 640 F. Supp. at 962. The court was careful to distinguish between endorsing the
physical symptoms requirement and holding that injury was a necessary element for recovery for
negligently induced emotional distress, Id.
21, Id. at 962-63. The court stressed that the rule originated in attempts by courts to distinguish
fraudulent claims from genuine ones without the assistance of medical knowledge. Id. at 962. It
noted that recent advances in medical science had reduced the potential for fraud to "tolerable"
levels. Id. Furthermore, the court was persuaded that not all emotional distress is manifested in
physical symptoms. Id. Finally, the court was troubled by the proposition that serious emotional
distress not manifesting itself in physical injury would go uncompensated, while a less compelling
claim would be recognized if there were physical injury. Id. at 963.
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on a negligent defendant for any emotional distress that a plaintiff could prove the
defendant caused. 2 " In the case at bar, the court Suggested that the plaintiff's evidence
of a fifty-six foot long pre-collision skid mark would support a jury's conclusion that the
decedent knew of the impending crash and suffered emotional distress during the
interval before impact. 212
 Whatever its own belief, however, the court stated that it was
bound by Kansas law to dismiss this and similar claims until that state Supreme Court
changed the rule. 215
When two early pre-impact emotional distress claims came before the Texas courts,
that state firmly adhered to the zone-of-danger rule. 2 ' 4 In ruling on the pre-impact
distress claims, however, the courts ignored the zone-of-danger test and treated the
claims as ones for pain and suffering, thus avoiding the need to test the viability of such
distress under this rule. 215 In a 1979 decision, Green a. Hale, the Texas Court of Civil
Appeals affirmed a jury award of $5,000 for the mental anguish of a thirteen-year old
boy killed when he fell out of, and was run over by, the defendant's truck. 2 '6 The court
rejected the defendant's contention that the evidence failed to support the award, noting
that the jury could presume suffering in those cases where it was the natural consequence
of the plaintiff's injury. 21 T The court noted that under state law, "consciousness of
2 " Id. The court did note that the absence of physical injury may diminish the credibility of
the plaintiff's claim, but the availability of advanced diagnostic techniques could help the genuinely
distressed plaintiff to recover. Id. Recognizing that its proposition could be labeled "bold," the court
suggested that an unexpressed judicial desire to adopt such a liberal approach might explain the
willingness of federal courts and other jurisdictions to strain to permit recovery for pre-impact




	 Elec. Co. v. Dorsett, 145 Tex. 95, 194 S.W,2d 546 (1946) (plaintiff suffered extreme
nervousness, severe headaches, lapse of memory, and brain deterioration due to fright after defen-
dant's bus narrowly missed striking plaintiff but ran into her mother); Gulf C. Sc S.F. Ry. v. Haylon,
93 Tex. 239, 54 S.W. 944 (1900) (plaintiff recovered for emotional distress manifested in nervous
condition diagnosed as traumatic neurasthenia after witnessing the impending collision between
the train on which he was a passenger and another train).
In a more recent Texas Supreme Court decision, involving a plaintiff's claim for emotional
distress which caused her to experience despondency, disorientation, neurosis, neck and shoulder
pain, and headaches, the court intimated that physical manifestations may no longer be necessary
to establish a claim. Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1983). Texas courts disagree about
whether Sanchez has, in fact, abrogated the physical injury requirement. Compare Baptist Hosp. v.
Baben, 672 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984) (physical manifestation no longer necessary) with Air
Florida v. Zondler, 683 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (proof of physical injury still reqUired).
See also, Cantor, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Expanding the Rule Evolved Since Dillon, 17
TEX. TECH L. REV., 1557, 1573 (1986) (characterizing the Zondler interpretation of Sanchez as
"better").
212
	 infra notes 216-26.
216 590 S.W.2d 231, 238 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979). The boy's father brought wrongful death and
survival actions against the truck driver and his company. Id. at 233-34. The company employed
the decedent and other youths to gather melons for market. Id. at 234. The accident occurred
when the employer loaded the boys into his pickup truck to take them into town For lunch. Id.
When one of the boyS lost his hat, the defendant driver stopped the truck. Id. The decedent was
in the process of getting off the truck to retrieve the hat when the defendant unexpectedly began
to back up. Id. The decedent fell off and was run over by the rear wheels of the truck. Id. The
driver stopped after he felt a "bump." Id.
217 Id. at 237. The defendant asserted that there was no evidence that the decedent suffered
any mental distress between the time he fell off the truck and the time he was struck. Id.
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approaching death is a proper element to consider in evaluating mental suffering ,"2I8
and that, even where such anguish was brief, "a tremendous amount of fear can be
in ferred." 219
In Hurst Aviation v. Junell, 220 the plaintiffs brought wrongful death and survival
actions against the pilot of a small propeller airplane and his employer after the defen-
dant's plane collided with the rear of a second plane, causing it to crash seconds later
and killing the pilot of the second aircraft and two passengers. 221 On appeal, the defen-
dants argued that there was no evidence — or alternatively, insufficient evidence — that
the decedent pilot experienced mental anguish in that short interva1, 222 and, in any case,
the award of $20,000 for such distress was excessive. 225 The court concluded that the
jury properly could infer that the pilot "suffered the horror of his impending doom" as
he was unable to regain control of the falling plane, 224 and held that consciousness of
approaching death is a proper element for consideration in determining an award for
mental suffering. 225 In sustaining the award, the court also noted that despite the brief
duration of the pilot's distress, the jury could also consider the amount of the decedent's
fear in determining the appropriate damages. 226
In the more recent case of Air Florida, Inc, v. Zondler, 227 however, the Texas Court
of Civil Appeals approached a claim for pre-impact distress as one for mental anguish. 228
The court stated that the Texas rule permitted recovery "only" for negligently inflicted
emotional distress which results in physical injury. 229 The court, however, did not have
216 1d. (quoting Jenkins v. Hennigan, 298 S.W.2d 905, 911 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957)).
2i`,
	 at 238.
220 642 S.W.2d 856 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982).
221 Id. at 858. The accident. occurred as the defendant pilot, an employee of the defendant
Hurst Aviation, began his descent in preparation for landing. Id. The planes were approximately
60 feet above the ground when the "tip-to-tail" collision occurred, Id, The defendant landed safely
at the airport. Id. The decedent's plane was discovered in a field adjacent to the airport, with the
pilot and one passenger dead inside. Id. The remaining passenger was found alive but succumbed
three hours later to injuries she sustained in the crash. Id.
222 Id .
225 Id. at 859. The defendants argued that "momentary" mental anguish could not sustain the
$20,000 award. Id.
224 Id. The court noted that under Texas law, the jury could consider the decedent's conscious-
ness of his or her approaching death as compensable mental suffering. Id. (citing Jenkins v.
Hennigan, 298 S.W.2d 905, 911 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957) and Green v. Hale, 590 S,W.2d 231, 237
(Tex. Civ. App. 1979)).
225 Id. (citing Jenkins, 298 S.W.2d at 911). The decedent in Jenkins was a passenger in a car
struck by the defendant. Id. at 908. Her heirs brought an action to recover for the pain and
suffering the decedent experienced from the time of the accident until her death. See id. at 913.
Thus, the statement upon which the Green and Juttell courts relied — that a victim's awareness of
his or her impending death may be included in a claim for mental suffering — came front a case
seeking compensation for mental anguish arising from physical injury, and not for emotional distress
suffered prior to injury.
226 See Junell, 642 S.W.2d at 859 (quoting Green v. Hale, 590 S.W.2d 231, 239 (Tex. Civ. App.
1979)). The court found that the defendants failed to meet their burden of showing that the award
was the result of passion or prejudice, or that the amount shocked the conscience of the court. Id.
227 683 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984).
228 1183 S.W.2c1 at 774.
22" 683 S.W.2d at 773. The Air Florida court noted that the case of Sanchez v. Schindler, 651
S.W.2c1 249 (1983), raised the issue of whether Texas still required physical injuries to establish
distress. 683 S.W.2d at 773. For a discussion of Sanchez, see supra note 214.
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to decide whether claims for pre-impact distress were subject to the same requirement
because the plaintiff failed to establish that the decedent, in fact, experienced mental
anguish prior to the crash. 23° In Air Florida, Inc., the decedent was a passenger in a plane
Which crashed into a bridge shortly after takeoff and sank into the icy Potomac River."'
The court upheld a jury's finding that the decedent suffered no mental anguish before
his death against a challenge that the finding was against the great weight and prepon-
derance of the evidence. 232 The only evidence the plaintiff offered on the mental anguish
issue was the statement of a survivor, an experienced air traveler who testified that he
knew from the plane's abnormal vibrations upon takeoff that "something was wrong,"
that other passengers "were looking around after take-off," and that he observed that
the plane would soon crash, and, therefore, prepared himself for the impact." The
court noted that the plaintiff offered no direct testimony concerning the decedent's
reactions during this interval."' Furthermore, the plaintiff failed to present evidence
that the decedent was seated where he was likely to have been aware of the crash. 235
Despite the Air Florida, Inc. court's assertion that claims for mental distress, including
pre-impact distress, must meet the zone-of-danger test, 236 in Green and Hurst Aviation the
Texas courts managed to circumvent this rule.
C. Pre-Impact Distress and the Genuineness Arising from the Circumstances Exception
In two zone-of-danger jurisdictions, courts have extended the exception abrogating
the physical manifestation requirement"? to encompass other situations where the facts
23" 683 S.W.2d at 775.
231 Id. at 770.
232 Id. at 775. The decedent was killed in the highly publicized crash of an Air Florida jet liner.
Id. at 770. His family brought a wrongful death action seeking recovery for their own mental
anguish in addition to the pecuniary losses they sustained as a result of the decedent's death. See
id. at 770.
235 Id. at 774.
23' Id. The witness did not know the decedent, nor did he testify as to any personal observations
about the decedent during the moments before the crash or immediately thereafter. Id,
235 Id. The court concluded that the jury finding was not against the evidence, noting that after
considering the evidence presented, the jury might have found it difficult to uphold a contrary
conclusion. Id. at 775.
It is interesting to note that the court also struck down the damages awarded to the decedent's
family members for their mental anguish, despite its conclusion that Texas law allowed recovery of
nonpecuniary losses to beneficiaries in a wrongful death action. Id. at 772-74. The court reviewed
recent Texas case law and determined that, when the cause of action was premised upon negligence,
"proof of accompanying physical injury is a necessary predicate to recover damages for mental
anguish." Id. at 773. The court found no evidence that the decedent's sons suffered physical
symptoms. Id. at 774. Even evidence that, upon learning of the tragedy, the decedent's wife
"collapsed against a wail" and later suffered severe depression and anxiety attacks the court found
insufficient. Id. The court noted that the plaintiffs failed to make explicit whether the wife's fall
was a "physical collapse" or simply a "natural emotional reaction," and whether her depression was
a psychological affliction as opposed to a physical one. Id. The court found that the plaintiffs failed
to establish that the wife's anxiety attacks were accompanied by physical symptoms. Id. The dis-
senting judge urged the majority to repeal the physical injury requirement, arguing that had the
decedent's wife fallen to her knees, and bruised them, upon learning of her husband's death, she
could recover for her mental anguish. Id. at 775-77 (Guillot, J., dissenting).
"6 Id. at 773
237 For a discussion of the two fact patterns meriting a recognized exception, see supra notes
122-27 and accompanying text.
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assure the claim's genuineness. 2" In Quill v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., the Minnesota
Court of Appeals permitted recovery for recurring emotional distress despite evidence
that the plaintiff suffered only slight physical symptoms. 239 The court concluded that
the "unusually disturbing experience" of being a passenger in a plane which almost
crashes and then continues to shake and vibrate until landing 40 minutes later provided
a guarantee of the claim's genuineness. 24° The plaintiff also sought recovery for the
emotional distress he suffered during the interval when the air craft plunged to earth
and he believed a crash was imminent; 241 he did not, however, allege any simultaneous
physical manifestations of his distress. 242 The court noted that these facts did not conform
to the recognized physical manifestation exceptions, 243 but concluded that the rationale
for those exceptions applied to and supported recovery in the case at bar. 244 The fact
that the plaintiff was subjected to such a "terrifying" experience 245 provided a guarantee
of genuineness240 which meant that there was no essential reason to deny recovery. 247
Thus, the court permitted recovery for the pre-impact distress despite the absence of
objective physical symptoms.
New York, which generally follows the zone-of-danger test, also abolished the re-
sulting physical injury requirement when the circumstances provide a guarantee of the
claim's genuineness. 2" When presented with pre-impact distress claims under New York
law, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and the Federal
District Court for the Southern District of New York did not test the claims under either
the zone-of-danger rule or its exceptions. Instead, they advanced different reasons why
such claims are compensable under New York law.249
The two cases arose out of the same 1979 airplane crash of American Airlines Flight
191.2" Flight 191 crashed in a field a few thousand feet away from the runway just after
take-off, killing all 271 passengers and crew rnembers. 251 Although the plane lust an
239
	
a discussion of the jurisdictions that have extended this exception, see supra notes 129-
40 and accompanying text.
2" 361 N.W.2d 438 (1985).
sou id. at 443.
241 Id.
2" The plaintiff's physical manifestation of distress occurred during subsequent plane flights.
See supra at note 135.
243 1d. The court first noted that the underlying purpose of the zone-of-danger rule was to
ensure the genuineness of the distress, but that the rule had generated considerable controversy
over the issue of what constituted a physical injury: Id.
244 The Quill court agreed with Dean Prosser's explanation that certain cases merited an excep-
tion to the physical manifestation requirement because they presented "an especial likelihood of
genuine and serious mental distress" which dispelled the need to require other guarantees of
genuineness. 361 N.W.2d at 443 (quoting PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, at § 54).
245 Quill court stated that "Nile nature of that experience guarantees plaintiff suffered





(quoting PROSSER & KEE.ToN, supra note 8, at § 54).
299
	
supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
299
	 supra notes 255-65 and accompanying text.
250
	
re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Illinois, On May 25,1979,507 F. Supp 21 (N.D. III.
1980). This is the same airplane crash from which the Illinois Air Crash cases arose. See supra text
at notes 181-84 and 190-97.
251 National Transportation Safety Board, Aircraft Accident Reports: American Airlines, Inc.,
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engine on its left side during takeoff, it gained an altitude of about 300 feet, 252 began
to roll to the left approximately eleven seconds before the crash, 2" and reached a 90-
degree angle to the ground three seconds before crashing." In Malacynski v. McDonnell-
Douglas Corp., 255 the widower of a passenger killed in the crash sought recovery for the
decedent's pain and suffering caused by her apprehension of her impending death. 256
The Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York held that the plaintiff's
claim was compensable under New York law 257 The court reasoned that a pre-impact
mental anguish claim was consistent with two "well-settled principles" of New York law:
first, that recovery is available for mental distress caused by fear of personal injury, even
when such injury does not occur;258 and second, that recovery is available for post-impact
pain and suffering sustained when a decedent regains consciousness after impact. 259 The
district court also noted that one New York state court indicated that it would recognize
such a claim under the proper circumstances. 26°
DC-10-10, NILOAA, Chicago, O'Hare International Airport, Chicago, Illinois, May 25, 1979 at 2
(1979) (hereinafter NTSB Report]. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) concluded
that the accident was not survivable "because impact forces exceeded human tolerance." Id. at 11.
In addition, two persons in the vicinity of the crash were killed, and two others were seriously
injured. Id. at 2.
252 Id. Just before takeoff, the left engine separated from the plane and fell onto the runway.
The NTSB concluded that the design and improper maintenance procedures caused the separation.
Id. at 1.
253 Id . at 5 .
254 Id.
2'5 565 F. Supp. 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
255 Id. at 105.
257 Id. at 106. The court noted that the parties did not contest the application of New York law.
Id. at 106 n.2. Defendant American Airlines moved to dismiss the plaintiff's claim for pre-impact
distress, claiming that New York law did not recognize this cause of action. Id. at 105. The
defendant's contention was based on Clancy v. Port of New York Auth., 55 A.D.2d 587, 389 N.Y.S.2d
615 (1976), where the court dismissed a claim for the pain and suffering experienced by a decedent
who fell twenty-five stories down an elevator shaft to his death. The Clang court stated that an
award could not be sustained "because it cannot be successfully maintained that decedent's life
lasted for even the smallest interval of time after the tremendous impact resulting from his fall."
Id. at 588, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 616 (emphasis added). The Malacynski court found the defendant's
reliance 'on Clang unwarranted, as it concluded that Clang did not involve a claim for pre-impact
damages. Malacynski, 565 F. Supp. at 106 n.3.
2" Id. at 106 (citing Battalla v. State of New York, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34, 176 N.E.2d
729 (1961)).
252 Malacynski, 565 F. Supp. at 106 (citations omitted).
252 Id. (citing Anderson v. Rowe, 73 A.D.2d 1030, 425 N.Y.S.2d 180 (1980)). In Anderson, the
administrator of the estates of two decedents sought compensation for the pain and suffering of
the victims despite evidence that they were killed immediately upon impact. In discussing the claim,
the court noted that the plaintiff was unable to present any evidence that the victims suffered any
pain or introduce any evidence which would imply "that the decedents were aware of the danger
and suffered from pre-impact terror." Anderson, 73 A.D.2d at 1031, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 181. The
Malacynski court concluded that this language evidenced state judicial recognition of a claim for
pre-impact distress. Malacynski, 565 F. Supp. at 106.
The district court in Malacynski also refused to grant the defendant's motion for summary
judgment. id. The defendant argued that the plaintiff could not introduce sufficient proof to justify
the inference that the decedent was aware of the impending disaster or experienced fear. Id. at
107. The plaintiff countered that evidence provided by eyewitnesses to the crash, information on
file with the NTSB, and the decedent's seat assignment were sufficient to justify this inference. Id.
The court refused to summarily dismiss the claim, stating that it was "inclined to believe that the
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In Lin v. McDonnell -Douglas Corp., 261 another case arising out of the Flight 191 crash,
the same court that decided Malacynski reiterated its holding that New York law permits
recovery for pre-impact pain and suffering. 262 The court reasoned that pre-impact
recovery was just a "short step" from the already permissible recovery for pain and
suffering experienced after injury. 2" The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed this decision, stating that it found "no intrinsic or logical barrier to recovery
for the fear experienced during a period in which the decedent is uninjured but aware
of an impending death." 264 In fact, the more controversial issue in Lin was whether the
plaintiffs had introduced sufficient evidence to support their claim for pre-impact an-
guish, not whether this claim was legally cognizable.20
evidence as described by plaintiff's counsel would support such an inference that Malacynski knew
she was in immediate danger when the aircraft turned nose-up and rolled over due to the loss of
an engine ... ." Id.
251 574 F. Supp. 1407 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), modified, 742 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1984). The suit, brought
by the administrator of the decedent's estate and his wife and children, sought compensation for
the decedent's pain and suffering prior to his death. Id. at 1409, 1416. The jury awarded $10,000
for the decedent's pre-impact fright, and the defendants moved for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict. Id. at 1416.
2(.' 574 F. Supp. at 1416.
265 Id. The district court relied on the fact that New York law permitted recovery for a decedent's
post-injury pain and suffering and that New York courts included apprehension of impending
injury as a proper element of post-injury pain and suffering. Id. (citing, inter alia, Juiditta v.
Bethlehem Steel Gorp., 75 A.D.2d 126, 138, 428 N.Y.S.2d 535, 543 (4th Dept. 1980) ("degree of
consciousness, severity of pain, apprehension of impending death along with duration" are all
factors to be considered in awarding damages for pain and suffering)). The Lin court also found
explicit judicial approval of the claim in Malacynski and Anderson, and stated that Clancy was
inapposite, as that court considered only post-impact pain and suffering. Lin, 574 F. Supp. at 1416
& n.4 (citing Malacynski, 565 F. Supp. at 107; Anderson, 73 A.D.2d at 1031, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 181;
Clarity, 55 A.D.2d 587, 389 N.Y.S.2d 615).
254 Shu-Tao Lin v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 742 F.2d 45, 53 (2d Cir. 1984). The appellate
court stated that its conclusion was based "substantially" upon the reasons advanced by the trial
court. The court also found support for its decision in Anderson, which, according to the Second
Circuit, implicitly recognized this type of damages. Id. (citing Anderson, 73 A.D.2d at 1031, 425
N.Y.S.2d at 180).
"5 She-Tao Lin, 574 F. Supp. at 1417. Noting that the absence of survivors deprived the court
of direct evidence of the decedent's pre-itnpact trauma, the district court concluded that evidence
that the decedent was assigned a window seat on the same side of the plane from which the engine
broke away allowed the fact finder reasonably to infer that the decedent saw this event. Id. Alter-
natively, the court determined that the plane's sudden banking, altitude loss, and subsequent
nosedive reasonably supported the inference that the decedent became aware of his peril prior to
impact. Id. On appeal, the Second Circuit, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
plaintiffs, found that a fact finder could conclude that the decedent saw the engine break away and
thus was aware of his peril fOr approximately thirty seconds. Shu-Tao Lin, 742 F.2d at 53. The
Second Circuit did not address the reasonableness of the inference that the decedent experienced
pre-impact fear due to the change in the plane's altitude. See id.
The Second Circuit was Forced to distinguish two other cases arising out of the same crash,
also involving pre-impact distress claims, in which the court found for the defendant. In Shatkin
McDonnell-Douglas Corp., the Second Circuit reversed an $87,500 jury award for the pain and
suffering the decedent experienced before the crash. 727 F.2d 202, 204 (2d Cir. 1984). The court
assumed that New York law would recognize the claim but found no evidence to support a finding
that the decedent suffered any pre-impact distress. Id. at 206-07. While noting that eyewitness
testimony of the decedent's pain and suffering was not required — and indeed in these types of
cases would be difficult to secure — the court found that the plaintiff' failed to introduce even
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D. Pre-Impact Distress Claims under Louisiana Law
In a case of first impression, 266 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had to
determine whether the State of Louisiana recognized a cause of action for pre-impact
fear experienced by a passenger killed in an airplane crash. In Haley v. Pan American
World Airways, Inc., 267
 the court noted the lack of any Louisiana decisions directly on
point. It determined, however, that recognizing such a cause of action furthered the
"broad compensatory principle" underlying the Louisiana Civil Code pursuant to which
the plaintiffs brought their wrongful death and survival claims, 268 and also comported
with Louisiana precedent permitting recovery for mental anguish and fright suffered
while an ordeal was in progress. 269 The Haley court, after reviewing Louisiana case law,
circumstantial evidence which would support an inference of emotional distress. Id. (citing Solomon
v. Warren, 540 F.2d 777, 779 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed sub nom., Warren v. Serody, 434 U.S.
801 (1977). The decedent in Shatkin, however, was assigned a seat on the right side of the plane,
and lacking evidence that his attention was called to the problem, the court stated that it would be
"sheer speculation" to suggest the decedent knew of the loss of the left engine. Id. at 206. Eyewitness
evidence that the plane tilted and roiled was also insufficient, according to the Shatkin court, as it
is a "common experience" for any plane, even one not experiencing problems, to bank sharply to
one side to conform to a prescribed traffic pattern. Id. at 207. The court did note that the plane
went into a 90 degree plunge only three seconds before it crashed, but did not explain why such a
dramatic change in altitude and position, even for a short interval, was insufficient to support an
inference that the decedent became aware of impending disaster. Id. at 206.
It is interesting to note that the Second Circuit was also silent on the district court's conclusion
in Shu-Tao Lin that pre-impact pain and suffering could be inferred from the plane's rapid descent,
if not on an inference that the decedent saw the engine break away. See Shu-Tao Lin, 742 F.2d at
53. Is the Second Circuit implying that three seconds of peril is insufficient as a matter of law to
cause pre-impact emotional trauma? If so, this would seem to be at odds with Anderson, where it
was riot the short interval of the decedent's awareness of impending death that precluded recovery,
but a failure to produce evidence of trauma. 73 A.D.2d at 1031, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 181.
The Shu-Tao Lin court concluded that its holding in O'Rouke v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 730
F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1984), also was not contrary to its Shu-Tao Lin holding. Shu-Tao Lin, 742 F.2d at
53 n.11. In O'Rouke, the decedent was killed when the plane on which he was a passenger crashed
during its approach to Kennedy International Airport. 730 F.2d at 845. The Second Circuit affirmed
the trial court's exclusion of the survivor's testimony. Id. at 854. The plaintiff argued that testimony
concerning the conditions within the cabin after the plane wing struck the ground and before the
final impact five to ten seconds later was nut irrelevant, as it would have provided "sufficient
circumstantial evidence to allow the trial court to draw the reasonable inference that Idle decedent]
probably suffered consciously ...." Id, (quoting Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant at 21)
(emphasis supplied by court). The appellate court ruled, however, that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in excluding this evidence because the witness was seated ten to fifteen feet away from
the decedent and admittedly did not know what happened to the decedent before the crash. Id. at
854-55.
2" For a discussion of the Louisiana approach to emotional distress claims see supra notes 157-
61 and accompanying text.
267 746 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1984). On July 9, 1982 the plaintiffs' son was a passenger on a Pan
American plane which crashed and disintegrated upon impact with the ground. Id. at 313. The
plane had ascended to a height of 163 feet after takeoff, and then began to descend and roll to
the left, causing the wing to strike a tree limb. Id. at 315-16. The aircraft then rolled to the ground
and disintegrated approximately six seconds later. Id.
268 Id. at 313-15. Article 2315 of the Louisiana Civil Code states in pertinent part . : "Every act
whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair
it." L.A. Cm CODE ANN. art. 2315 (West Supp. 1984). This section of the code provides for survival
actions and recovery for wrongful death. Guidry V. Theriot, 377 So. 2d 319, 322 (La. 1979).
26'' 746 F.2d at 313-14 (citations omitted). While conceding that the cases upon which it relied
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concluded that mental anguish is itself a compensable injury, regardless of whether it is
accompanied by physical injury.") The court acknowledged that, because all on board
were killed, no one would ever "know" whether the decedent was aware of his peril 27t
or the exact duration of his awareness, 272 but concluded that it was "reasonable" to infer
apprehension of death for at least the four to six seconds after the plane hit the tree
and before it disintegrated. The court, therefore, upheld the $15,000 award to the
plaintiffs. 2"
E. Pre-Impact Distress and Federal Statutory Law
Statutory law also provides an avenue of redress. Plaintiffs have sought damages
for pre-impact distress under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) 274 and the
involved recovery for post-impact mental anguish, the court declined to find that Louisiana courts
would sever an "ordeal" into pre- and post-impact segments for purposes of awarding damages for
emotional distress. Id. at 314. For a discussion of Louisiana cases in which plaintiffs sought recovery
fur mental distress experienced while an ordeal was in progress, see infra notes 341-43 and
accompanying text.
22D 746 F.2d at 314 (citations omitted).
" I Id. at 317. The defendant claimed that the plaintiff failed to introduce sufficient evidence
that the decedent suffered any pre-impact fear. Id. at 315. The plaintiffs, however, did produce a
videotape simulation of the take-off and crash, along with testimony by a psychiatrist who had
treated survivors of other air crashes. Id. at 315-16. The psychiatrist testified that, at least from
the time the plane hit the tree, if not earlier when it began to roll and descend, most, if not all,






Contrary to defendant's argument that damages were too speculative, the court found
sufficient evidence to support the award. Id. The court also rejected the defendant's contention
that $15,000 for four to six seconds of anguish was excessive. Id. at 318. The court reviewed pre-
impact distress damage awards in other jurisdictions and concluded that the sum was neither
"shocking" nor contrary to reason. Id. at 318.
In another case arising from the same airplane crash, Pregeant v. Pan American World Airways
Inc., the Fifth Circuit reiterated its holding in Haley that Louisiana law recognized a cause of action
for pre-impact fear. 762 F.2d 1245, 1247 (5th Cir. 1985). The Pregeant court upheld a $16,000 jury
award for pre-impact pain and suffering that lasted not more than 20 seconds, noting that the
decedent, a former flight attendant and experienced flier, could be expected to detect danger
sooner than the average passenger. Id. at 1248-49 & n.2.
The Fifth Circuit did, however, find excessive a $25,000 jury award for a victim's pre impact
terror on the evidence presented in In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, Louisiana on July
9, 1982, 789 F.2d 1092, 1099 (5th Cir. 1986). The court found the testimony of "unusual sound[ing]
engines," "violent maneuvering" until the plane was 90 degrees off level, and the wingtip smashing
trees as it descended sufficient to raise a jury issue, but concluded that this evidence did not justify
such a large award. Id. at 1098-99. It distinguished the awards in Haley and Pregeant on the ground
that "the quantity and quality of the evidence" in those cases exceeded that presented in the case
at bar. Id. at 1099. The Filth Circuit noted that in Haley and Pregeant, the plaintiffs had produced
a videotape simulating the takeoff and crash, as well as psychiatric testimony about the passengers'
probable condition and reactions. Id. No such evidence was presented in this case, the court
observed. Id. Thus, the court ordered the plaintiffs to accept remittitur to $7500 for the pre-impact
fear, or the court would grant a new trial on the issue of damages. Id.
224 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-6(1 (1982). FELA gives employees of common carriers who are injured in
the course of their employment the right to recover for their injuries.
Section 1 of the FELA, 45 U.S.C. § 51, provides for a right of recovery for the injury
of an employee of a common carrier by rail, in interstate or foreign commerce, and
in case of the death of the employee to his [or her] personal representative or certain
designated dependents when it results "in whole or in part from the negligence of
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Jones Act.275 The first court to discuss such a claim denied recovery under the Jones
Act, describing as "a mere guess" the damages recoverable for emotional suffering
endured by a seaman who fell thirty feet to his death. 276 In dicta, however, another court
suggested that the Jones Act would allow recovery for pre-impact distress despite the
brevity of the suffering. 2" In Kozar v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co., a case brought
under FELA, the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan
allowed recovery for pre-impact fright. 278 The decedent in Kozar, the foreman of a crew
responsible for removing wrecked trains from the railroad bed and returning derailed
cars to the track,279
 was killed when a crane malfunctioned and dropped a refrigerator
car on him. 280
 One of Kozar's co-workers shouted a warning as the car began to fall, but
any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier, or by reason of any defect
or insufficiency, due to its negligence, it its ... appliances, machinery, ... or other
equipment."
M. NORMS, THE LAW OF SEAMEN, § 660 (3d ed. 1970) (quoting 45 U.S.C. § 51). The Act was passed
in 1908 in response to the then-common law rule that "the death of a human being, though
wrongfully caused, affords no basis for the recovery of damages, and a right of action for personal
injuries dies with the injured person." A nnot. Recovery In Action Under Federal Employers' Liability Act
or Jones Act for Deceased's Pain and Suffering Between Injury and Death Federal Cases, 13 L.Ed.2d 1014
(1965),
27 ' 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1982). .The Jones Act, enacted in 1920, extends the FELA provisions to
seamen and, in the case of the seaman's death, to his or her personal representative. Id. The Act
permits "[a]ny seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his [or her] employment
... [to] maintain an action for damages at law [against his or her employer] with the right of trial
by jury." Id. All federal statutes that modify or expand a common law right or remedy in personal
injury actions are applicable to cases brought under the Jones Act. NORMS, supra note 274, at 659.
276 Smith v. United States, 121 F. Supp. 778, 785 (S.D. Tex. 1953), aff'd on other grounds, 220
F.2d 548 (5th Cir, 1955). The seaman was killed when the rope ladder which he was climbing broke
away, causing him to fall onto the ship's deck and then into the water. Id. While the plaintiffs
attempted to prove that the seaman survived after he struck the deck and thus was conscious of
his peril as he fell into the water, the court found it unclear whether impact with the deck or
drowning caused the seaman's death. Id.
277
	 v. Lane Sc Co., 298 F. Supp, 194, 196 (E.D. La. 1969). The decedent was working
on a pile driving rig approximately 50 feet above the deck of a barge. Id. at 194. He was struck in
the chest by a piling and fell to the deck below. Id. Medical experts testified that the decedent died
on impact with the deck but did not indicate whether he was conscious during the fall. Id. The jury
returned a verdict awarding damages for the decedent's pre-death suffering. Id. at 194-95.
The court found that, because of conflicting evidence, the jury could find that the decedent
experienced a brief period of conscious pain and suffering prior to death. The court also concluded
that despite judicial pronouncements to the contrary, the Jones Act did not eliminate a cause of
action merely because of the limited time the decendent suffered. Id. 198-99. To better support
its own decision to permit recovery, the Wiggins court stated: "If a seaman fell from the mast into
the sea, [and] was rescued a few seconds later after almost drowning, ... it would appear certain
that he could recover for the fright suffered in the moments when he thought he was falling to his
death." Id. at 196 (footnote omitted).
278 320 F. Supp. 335, 365-66 (W.D. Mich. 1970), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 449 F.2d 1238
(6th Cir. 1971).
219 1d. at 341. This job, which the court characterized as "extremely hazardous," required the
crew to clear wrecked and derailed cars from the defendant's rail beds. Id.
"° Id. at 342. The crane's brake system, which was supposed to prevent the raised object from
slipping and falling, had been in a defective condition for at least four years prior to this incident.
Id. at 343. After the crane lifted the 40-ton refrigerated car, the decedent walked either alongside
or under the car, to inspect and determine where to place the ties necessary to pivot the car to
position it parallel to the tracks. It was then that the car began to slip. Id. at 342.
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the decedent could not escape in time. 2" The jury awarded $500 for the fright the
decedent experienced after he realized the car was falling and before it struck hini. 282
The court concluded that the evidence supported a finding that the decedent suffered
emotional distress when he knew he was about to die and because of the impact the
tragedy would have on his family. 283 Concluding that FELA allowed such damages, the
court emphasized that the statute provided recovery to any person suffering "injur y,"284
and noted that a number of courts had construed the term to encompass mental agony
and emotional fright. 265 It concluded that there was no legal distinction between a mental
distress injury suffered before impact and one suffered after. 286 The court also noted
that the statute contained no language barring such damages and relied upon the
Supreme Court's admonition against construing FELA in a "narrow ... and niggardly"
fashion to support its interpretation. 287 The Texas Court of Appeals, relying on Kozar,
2" Id. at 364. The plaintiff sought $10,000 for this pain and suffering. Id. The jury, however,
awarded no damages for the decedent's pain and suffering after he was struck by the car, concluding
that lie experienced no conscious pain and suffering during the interval between impact and death.
Id. at 340.
2" Id. at 366. The court noted the evidence that the decedent took his family obligations
seriously, and found that the jury could infer that he suffered greatly at the thought of the effect
of his death on his family. Id.
2" Id. at 365 (quoting 45 U.S.C. §§ 51 and 59) (emphasis supplied by court).
285 Id. at 365-66 (citations omitted).
286 See id. at 366. The court stated that if any distinction exists between pre- and post-impact
mental distress, it is factual in nature and should, therefore, be left to the jury. Id.
The court noted, however, that every case cited by the plaintiff as precedent for pre-impact
distress in fact involved some physical impact before the mental fright and suffering. See id. at 364.
The only case that actually addressed pre-impact distress was Smith v. United States, 121 F. Supp.
778 (S.D. Tex, 1953), aff'd on other grounds, 220 F.2d 548 (5th Cir. 1955). See also supra note 276
and accompanying text. The plaintiff' in Kozar argued that the court in Smith denied recovery based
on the facts presented, not the law, and argued that the trier of fact should be allowed to consider
whether the decedent experienced such distress. Kozar, 320 F. Supp. at 365. The Kozar court agreed
that recovery was denied in Smith because of that plaintiff's failure to present sufficient evidence,
but found that where such damages were not speculative, no rule of law barred recovery. See id. at
366.
287 Id. (quoting Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R. 352 U.S. 500, 509 (1957)). The Kozar court asserted
that it was the United States Supreme Court's opinion, as expressed in Rogers, that Congress
mandated a generous interpretation of the statute:
The fact that Congress has not seen fit to substitute ... [a worker's compensation plan
for that statutory] scheme requiring fault cannot relieve this Court of its obligation to
effectuate the present congressional intention by granting certiorari to correct in-
stances of improper administration of the Act and to prevent its erosion by narrow
and niggardly construction.
Id. (quoting Rogers, 352 U.S. at 509 (emphasis deleted)). It is important to note that the Rogers
Court was not commenting upon the extent of the Act's coverage, but instead was reminding the
courts that Congress intended that the fury would decide whether the employer's fault was in any
way causally responsible for the employee's injury, and not the court, as had occurred in Rogers.
Rogers, 352 U.S. at 509-10. It was this congressional intent which the Supreme Court warned courts
were eroding by "narrow and niggardly construction." Rogers, however, does implicitly support the
idea that the statute should be generously construed to allow recovery. For instance, the employer
in Rogers argued that the statute permitted recovery only if the evidence established that the
employer's negligence was the "sole, efficient, producing cause of injury." Id. at 506. The Supreme
Court rejected this interpretation of the statute, holding that recovery was possible under the statute
whenever "employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or
death for which damages are sought." /d. (footnote omitted).
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similarly upheld a verdict under FELA for the mental anguish suffered by a railroad
employee who was thrown to the ground in front of an oncoming train and struck and
killed as he scrambled to get out of its path.296 Thus, under a federal law providing
recovery for "injuries" to federal employees, pre-impact distress presents a viable claim.
IV. WERE THE DECISIONS CORRECT?
This portion of the Article examines the previously discussed judicial holdings on
claims for pre-impact stress. It seeks to determine whether the courts, in fact, employed
the proper approach, as determined by precedent in that jurisdiction, in ruling on the
issue and, if so, whether the court properly applied the approach in arriving at its
decision. The text analyzes decisions reached in jurisdictions adhering to the impact
rule,299
 the zone-of-danger test, 29° and the genuineness in the circumstance exception, 291
as well as those cases decided under Louisiana292 and Federal statutory law. 2" A critical
review of the decisions illuminates the deficiencies of approaches used and demonstrates
the need for a new approach, a rule that is limited in scope to pre-impact distress. Such
a rule is the focus of a subsequent section of this article. 294
A. The Impact jurisdictiow
Courts in two jurisdictions which followed the impact rule reached opposing con-
clusions regarding whether a cause of action for pre-impact emotional distress was
compatible with the rule. The Federal District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
in In re Aircrash Disaster Near Chicago — a decision handed down prior to the state's
decision to abandon the impact rule — dismissed the claim, holding that the impact rule
required that the impact in fact cause emotional distress. 20 The Fifth Circuit, however,
in Solomon v. Warren, held that even subsequent impact provided the basis for granting
relief for the plaintiff's distress. 296
Judicial precedent and the original rationale behind the impact rule support the
Fifth Circuit's conclusion that a plaintiff need not establish a causal relationship between
impact and emotional distress. First, some courts in earlier decisions had permitted
recovery even though emotional distress preceded the impact. 297 In other cases, courts
allowed recovery for distress which was unrelated to the contact. 298 Second, the Filth
288 Port Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. Sweet, 640 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982), aff 'd, 653 S.W.2d
291 (Tex. 1983). In this wrongful death action, brought pursuant to FELA by the widow of a
railroad employee, the decedent was riding on the outside of the train's lead car and was thrown
forward and run over after the train lurched. Id. at 363. The jury awarded $25,000 for the
decedent's pre-death pain and suffering. Id. The Sweet court reduced the award to $10,000, finding
the evidence insufficient to support a conclusion that the decedent was conscious at any time after
being struck by the train and before his death. id. at 366-67.
299 See infra note '295-303 and accompanying text.
29° See infra notes 304-39 and accompanying text.
2" See infra notes 324-38 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 339-44 and accompanying text.
295 See infra notes 347-49 and accompanying text.
2" See infra notes 350-62 and accompanying text.
295 See supra notes 181-84,190-97 and accompanying text.
296 See supra notes 172-75 and accompanying text.
297 See supra cases cited at note 84.
299 See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
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Circuit's decision is justified in light of the impact rule's purposes. One purpose of the
rule is to discourage false or frivolous claims. 2" Allowing recovery to plaintiff's who
suffered emotional distress prior to impact, that is, those plaintiffs who are unable to
prove a causal relationship between impact and distress but who nevertheless experience
the actual impact which they feared would happen, would not pose any greater risk of
fabricated claims than would the rule of allowing recovery where the impact precedes
the distress."° A rule requiring a causal relationship between impact and distress would
not only deny recovery to plaintiffs who managed to avoid impact altogether, as the
dissenting judge correctly noted in Solomon,30 ' but would also deny recovery to plaintiffs
who ultimately experienced the impact they apprehended. Thus, the Solomon court's
holding, which allows recovery for some distress claims in which no causal link is estab-
lished, is compatible with the impact rule's intention to allow recovery for a greater
variety of plaintiffs.
The In re Aircrash court's reliance on prior Illinois case law which denied recovery
for emotional suffering3 U2 does not support the In re Aircrash court's conclusion that
under Illinois law, recovery is predicated on the fact of prior impact. The plaintiffs in
cases prior to In re Aircrash failed to prevail on their mental distress claims simply because
they could not establish the requisite contact. 303
B. The Zone of Danger jurisdictions
Recovery for pre-impact distress in those jurisdictions which have adopted the zone-
of-danger rule poses a difficult problem. While it cannot be denied that the victims meet
the first prong of the test — being within the zone of physical danger — the requirement
that the emotional distress manifest itself in physical injury may make recovery nearly
impossible in instances where the victim dies or the impact occurs soon after recognition
of the danger. Pre-impact distress often results from circumstances that preclude more
than a fleeting recognition and apprehension of danger before the feared event occurs." 4
While the Illinois district court, ruling on the availability of pre-impact distress under
the state's recently adopted zone-of-danger test, noted that the "necessarily short dura-
tion" of pre-impact distress should not preclude recovery if the loss is otherwise corn-
pensable,"5 such a brief interval may preclude any physical manifestation of the emo-
tional distress.3U6 Furthermore, even if the plaintiff can show some physical manifestation,
such as increased heart rate, sweating, or pupil dilation, the effect of this proof on the
pre-impact distress claim will depend on how stringently the jurisdiction applies the
physical manifestation factor."' For instance, in jurisdictions adopting the comments to
2°°
	 supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
000 Dean Prosser's suggestion that the true value of the impact lies in the opportunity it affords
a defendant to defend against a claim for emotional distress on testimony that there was no contact
is not in any way weakened by this conclusion. See supra note 70.
101 See supra text at note 177.
See supra notes 184 and accompanying text.
303 See supra note 184.
" The experience of' the passengers on the Japan Air Lines flight provides a notable exception.
There, the passengers were aware of their peril for some thirty minutes before the plane actually
crashed. See supra note 7.
333 In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,215, 17,216 (N.D. III. 1983).
306 See Comment, Independent Tort, supra note 35, at 1249-50.
" See supra note 197 and accompanying text.,
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the Restatement of Torts (Second) as a guideline, courts may deem such manifestations
"inconsequential," and failing to meet the "substantial bodily harm" language." Other
jurisdictions which have spoken simply in terms of physical consequences or manifesta-
tions may find that fleeting physical responses to the impending danger are sufficient to
allow recovery for the emotional distress.
Given the physical injury requirement in Pennsylvania and Kansas, the courts in
Nye v. Commonwealth and Fogarty v. Campbell 66 Express properly found against the plain-
tiffs where there was no proof that the decedent's emotional distress manifested itself in
any physical symptoms." The Illinois district court's conclusion, however, in In re Air
Crash Disaster Near Chicago that, because the Illinois Supreme Court recently abandoned
the impact rule in favor of the zone-of-danger rule,310 minimal physical responses, if
proved, could support recovery for pre-impact distress, is more suspect. In Rickey v.
Chicago Transit Authority, the case in which Illinois abandoned the impact rule, the Illinois
Supreme Court stated that damages for physical "injury or illness" resulting from emo-
tional distress were compensable. 3 " The victim's ailments in In re Air Crash Disaster Near
Chicago constituted neither. And while the Rickey court did, at one point, state that the
plaintiff's complaint was sufficient because it alleged "physical manifestations,"" the
Rickey facts make it clear that the plaintiff's symptoms were serious and prolonged. ,"
Furthermore, the Illinois Supreme Court explicitly declined to follow the approach
advocated by the California Supreme Court in Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals — an
approach that would allow recovery for emotional distress alone —because that standard
was "too vague."3 " Thus, it is likely that the Rickey court would reject the sweaty palms
and increased heart rate that the In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago court found
sufficient to satisfy the physical manifestation prong of the zone-of-danger rule." Not-
withstanding its improvident use of the phrase "physical manifestations," in Rickey the
Illinois Supreme Court carefully characterized the plaintiff's suffering as "definite,"
"extreme," "prolonged," and "continuing."" In addition, it is certainly valid to question
the district court's determination that a court which adhered to the impact rule as the
test of recovery for emotional distress for over a century suddenly would allow any
physical symptoms manifested by the decedent to satisfy the zone-of-danger rule."
508 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A comment c (1965).
309
	 v. Commonwealth, 331 Pa. Super. 209, 480 A.2d 318 (1984); Fogarty v. Campbell 66
Express, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 953 (D. Kan. 1986). See supra notes 200-13 and accompanying text.
"D In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) at 17,215; reconsideration in light
of Rickey v. Chicago Transit Authority, 98 III. 2d 546, 457 N.E.2d 1 (1983). For a discussion of
Rickey, see supra note 191.
311 Rickey, 98 III. 2d at 555, 457 N.E.2d at 5. See also supra notes 191-92 and accompanying
text.
312 Rickey, 98 Ill. 2d at 556, 457 N.E.2d at 5. See also supra note 192.
3 ' 3 Rickey, 98 111. 2d at 449-50, 457 . N.E.2d at 2. See also supra note 192.
31'
	 98 III. 2d at 544, 457 N.E.2d at 4. See also supra note 191.
313 See supra text at note 197.
316 Rickey, 98 III. 2d at 549-50, 457 N.E.2d at 2. See also supra note 192.
"' This interpretation is further bolstered by the recent case of Goldberg v. Ruskin, 128 111.
App. 3d 1029, 471 N.E.2d 530 (1984). That court stated that, after studying the Rickey opinion,
"we believe that physical injury or illness must be established in order for a plaintiff to recover for
negligently caused emotional distress, regardless of whether the plaintiff was the direct victim or a
bystander." Id. at 1043, 471 N.E.2d at 539-40 (emphasis added). The Minnesota Court of Appeals
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The approach of the Texas courts to claims for pre-impact distress is most difficult
to understand. Although there has been some suggestion that a 1983 Texas Supreme
Court decision may have abrogated the physical injury requirement for emotional dis-
tress, at the time of two early decisions concerning pre-impact distress, Texas firmly
adhered to the zone-of-danger rule.318 In Green v. Hale and Hurst Aviation v. Junell,
however, the courts ignored the rule entirely. In Green v. Hale, the Court of Civil Appeals
characterized the decedent's pre-impact distress as pain and suffering, and then relied
on a prior decision holding that consciousness of approaching death is a factor courts
may consider in evaluating these types of claims. 919 Thus, the Green decision is immedi-
ately suspect: the court treated the mental distress as parasitic to a physical injury, which
it logically is not because the mental distress preceded any physical harm. Furthermore,
the Green court responded to the defendant's contention that there was no evidence that
the decedent had experienced distress by noting that triers of fact may presume such
suffering "where it is the natural consequence of the injury of which the plaintiff
complains."529 Again, the court failed to realize, or ignored, the fact that the mental
anguish was not a consequence of any physical injury but, rather, of the decedent's
apprehension of danger immediately preceding the impact. By deciding Green as a pain
and suffering claim, the court avoided determining whether the zone-of-danger test's
physical manifestation requirement should apply to pre-impact cases at all. The Hurst
Aviation decision, in which the court similarly treated a claim for pre-impact distress as
one for pain and suffering, and relied on Green for support, suffers from the same
shortcomings. 321
Air Florida, Inc. v. Zondler is the first case to characterize a claim for pre-impact
distress as one for mental anguish. 322 The court did not reach the decision of whether
physical symptoms must be established to recover for pre-impact distress because the
plaintiff failed to introduce sufficient evidence showing any distress. 323 Without such
proof, damages should not be awarded under any test. Thus, the Air Florida court
correctly rejected plaintiff's claim.
was presented with equally ephemeral examples of physical consequences in Quill v. Trans•World
Airlines, Inc., 361 N.W.2d 438 (Minn. App. 1985). There the plaintiff's physical manifestations
included adrenaline surges, sweaty hands, and higher pulse and blood pressure. Id. at 441. Unlike
the decedents in In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, however, this pre-impact distress "victim" was
fortunate enough to have avoided the feared plane crash, and the physical symptoms of which he
complained manifested themselves not at the time he anticipated the crash, but during subsequent
flights. See id. See also In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Illinois on May 25, 1979, 18 Av. Cas.
(CCI-I) 17,215 (N.D. III. 1983).
Because the Minnesota Court in Quill preferred to view the case as one where the circumstances
giving rise to the claimed distress, and not the physical manifestations, assured its genuineness, 361
N.W.2d at 438, the fact that both courts found a cause of action for pre-impact distress under
similar facts does not weaken the conclusion that that district court wrongly decided the case.
3'E See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
3 ' 3 590 S.W.2d 231, 237 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (citing Jenkins v. Hennigan, 298 S.W.2d 905,
911 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957)).
32° Green, 590 S.W.2d at 237 (quoting 17 Tex. JUR. 2u Damages § 252, at 312 (emphasis added)).
321
	
Aviation v. June11, 642 S.W.2d 856, 859 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982) (citing Green, 590
S.W.2d at 237),
322 See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
323 683 S.W.2d 769, 775 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984),
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C. The Exceptions for Guarantees of Genuineness Jurisdictions
Plaintiffs advanced pre-impact distress claims in two zone-of-danger jurisdictions
which had suspended the physical injuries requirement when the circumstances giving
rise to the claim for emotional distress guaranteed the merits of the claim. In Minnesota,
under the "special guarantee of genuineness" exception, the Quill court, despite the lack
of proof of physical manifestations of the plaintiff's emotional distress, properly allowed
recovery for the pre-impact emotional distress he experienced as the plane plunged to
the ground. The Quill court accurately perceived that the experience was such that the
traditional concerns regarding spurious claims were not pertinent to this case. 324 In Quill,
the victim knew that the defendant's negligence had placed him in danger of serious
physical harm or death prior to the actual impact. 325 These facts support an exception
to the physical injury requirement which is at least as compelling as the negligent
notification of death or the corpse mishandling cases.326
Federal Courts applying New York law, however, ignored this approach when asked
to rule on the viability of such a claim. The Federal District Court for the Southern
District of New York and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals have concluded that a
cause of action for pre-impact distress exists under New York law, apparently without
requiring that the plaintiff establish physical manifestations."' The reasoning advanced
by these courts, however, does not withstand critical analysis. For instance, in Malacynski
v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., the district court cited a 1961 New York Court of Appeals
decision as support for its conclusion that that state allows recovery for emotional distress
even without resulting injury.328 While it is true that the minor plaintiff in Batalla v. Slate
of New York did not sustain physical injury as a consequence of any impact resulting from
the defendant's negligent failure to secure her properly on a ski lift, the court reported
that her distress resulted in "consequential injuries." 329 Thus, while one could interpret
Batalla as abolishing the impact requirement, the district court's conclusion that distress
unaccompanied by injury merits compensation under New York law is simply too gen-
erous.
The Malacynski court also relied on New York State cases allowing recovery for post-
impact pain and suffering, 330 but because such damages traditionally were awarded as
parasitic to the underlying physical injury claim,53 ' it is difficult to understand how such
recovery supports an independent cause of action. By addressing the claim for damages
under the rubric of pain and suffering, however incorrect, the Malacynski court side-
324 See Quill, 361 N.W.2d at 443. See also supra notes 245-47 and accompanying text.
323 See Quill, 361 N.W.2d at 440-41.
326
 Although Dean Prosser suggested that the two situations meriting exceptions shared a
guarantee of genuineness, he did not consider these exceptions exclusive. In fact, he suggested that
whenever such a guarantee of genuineness existed, recovery should be allowed. PROSSER & KEEroN,
supra note 8, at § 54. See also supra note 126 and accompanying text.
323 Malacynski v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp. 565 F. Supp. 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Shu-Tao Lin v.
McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 574 F. Supp. 1407 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). In neither Malacynski nor Shu-Tao
Lin was there any direct evidence that the victim exhibited any physical manifestations of their
distress. Malacynski, 565 F. Supp. at 105; Shu-Tao Lin, 574 F. Supp. at 1417.
328
 Malacynski, 565 F. Supp. at 106 (citing hattalla v. State of New York, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 219
N.Y.S.2d 34, 176 N.E.2d 729 (1961)).
329
 Ballalia, 10 N.Y.2d at 239, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 35. 176 N.E.2d at 730.
336 See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
331 See supra note 39.
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stepped any requirement that the plaintiff establish resulting physical injury. The same
criticism applies to the district court's reasoning in Shu-Tao Lin v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp.'" That court held that recovery for pre-impact distress was just a "short step"
from recovery for post-impact pain and suffering. 33 Post-impact pain and suffering are
associated with, and appended to, claims of physical injury." 4 Claims for pre-impact
emotional distress, however, are separate from any such injuries.
Finally, all three courts found a basis for their decisions in one memorandum
opinion, Anderson v. Rowe, in which the court dismissed a claim for pre-impact distress
because of the plaintiff's inability to show that the decedent was aware of the danger
and actually suffered the distress."3 Significantly, the court did not dismiss for failure
to state a cause of action. The Anderson court, however, did not indicate what type of
proof was necessary to establish that the decedent "suffered" pre-impact emotional
distress."6 Courts relying on Anderson may have correctly interpreted its meaning. It is
equally plausible, however, that Anderson did not suggest a break from the New York
"resulting injury" rule and would have required the plaintiff to introduce evidence of
resulting harm before allowing recovery for the pre-impact distress.
The federal courts could have reached the same conclusions by relying on those
cases in which the New York State courts permitted recovery for emotional distress
without physical symptoms where the defendant placed the plaintiff at risk of physical
harm and where the circumstances provided sufficient guarantees of genuineness."'
Certainly, the defendants' negligence in both Malacynski and Shu-Tao Lin created an
unreasonable risk of physical harm to the victims."8 Furthermore, the genuineness of
any emotional distress claim is evident from the fact that the feared event actually
occu red .
D. Louisiana
The Fifth Circuit, in Haley v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., found that damages
for pre-impact distress conformed with Louisiana law."9 The decision appears sound in
view of that state's generous approach to emotional distress claims. Louisiana courts have
rejected any physical manifestations requirement, preferring to allow a plaintiff to re-
cover whenever he or she can prove the existence of the claimed mental distress. 310
Thus, Louisiana plaintiffs do not have to clear the hurdle, presented in zone-of-danger
jurisdictions, of proving that they suffered physical manifestations of' the distress. Plain-
tiffs also do not need to consider whether an emotional distress followed by impact
sequence is sufficient to establish a cause or action, as required in an impact jurisdiction.
The Fifth Circuit derived much support from prior state decisions which broadly
pronounced that a plaintiff would receive compensation for emotional distress experi-
enced while an ordeal was in progress. 34 ' None of' these cases suggested that the "ordeal"
31s
	
Lin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 574 F. Supp. 1407,1416 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
'" See id.
335 73 A.D.2c1 1030,425 N.Y.S.2d 180 (1980).
33r Id.
3" For a discussion of these cases, see supra notes 129-81 and accompanying text.
3" See discussion supra at note 214.
339 746 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1984); see also supra notes 267-73 and accompanying text.
"" For a discussion of the Louisiana approach to emotional distress, see text at notes 128-32.
"I Haley, 746 F.2d at 313-14.
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commenced only after impact.'" The Fifth Circuit properly concluded that an "ordeal"
begins when the victim perceives the impending danger. This interpretation of the term
is more natural than one which would require physical contact before finding an ordeal
is in progress."" The Louisiana Civil Code, which requires those who have caused
"damages" to compensate the victim, also bolsters the Fifth Circuit's decision.'" Because
Louisiana courts have determined that mental distress experienced during an ordeal is
an independent element of damages, it appears incumbent upon a negligent defendant
to compensate the victim for such damage. Recovery for pre-impact distress, even in the
absence of physical manifestations, is thus proper under Louisiana law.
E. Federal Statutory Law
The recovery afforded individuals protected under FELA and the Jones Act for
pre-impact distress appears in harmony with the mandate of Congress, as interpreted
by the United States Supreme Court.'" As the Kozar v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co.
court noted, judicial construction of the term "injury" has included mental distress.'"
In view of the Supreme Court's caution to avoid stringent interpretations of the statute
which would preclude recovery, 347 the Kozar court's refusal to find a statutory distinction
between pre-impact mental distress and post-impact distress is sound.'" Mental distress,
when proven, is an injury no matter when it occurs.
Unfortunately, the Kozar and Port Terminal Railroad Association v. Sweet holdings
provide little assistance in analyzing the approaches various jurisdictions have taken in
pre-impact distress claims. With the partial exception of the Louisiana cases, in all the
other cases discussed in this Article the courts decided pre-impact distress claims based
on that jurisdiction's common law for recovery of similar claims. Those courts applying
the federal statutes were not so constrained. Instead, Kozar and the other federal cases
presented the issue of whether a pre-impact distress claim was cognizable under the
pertinent federal law — a matter of pure statutory construction.'" Thus, any disagree-
342 See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
so In Dawson v. James H. Stuart & Deaton, Inc., 437 So. 2d 974 (La. App. 1983), the defen-
dant's truck struck the plaintiff's vehicle from behind. Id. at 975. The plaintiff was compensated
not, however, for fear associated with this contact, but rather for the distress he experienced as his
vehicle came perilously close to being pushed over the edge of an elevated interstate, Id. at 976.
Thus, while the emotional distress occurred after the initial impact, the court allowed recovery for
the plaintiff's fear of a second impact under the "ordeal in progress" approach. Id. It would appear,
therefore, that in Dawson, the court focused on the victim's recognition of the danger to which he
was exposed and not the fact of impact.
944 LA. CIV, Cone ANN, art. 2315 (West Supp. 1984).
945 For a discussion of the Supreme Court's construction of FELA see supra note" 287.
3" Kozar v. Chesapeake & Ohio R., 320 F. Supp. 335, 365 (W.D. Mich. 1970), aff V in part and
vacated in part, 449 F.2d 1238 (fith Cir. 1981). See also supra note 284 and accompanying text.
317 See supra text at note 287.
"5 It must be noted again, however, that the Kozar court used this language out of context.
The Supreme Court, in Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 509 (1957), was cautioning
against a construction of the Act which took questions Congress desired to have resolved by a jury
as facts and gave them to the court to determine as matters of law. See supra note 287 and
accompanying text. The Rogers decision, however, provides implicit support for an expansive
interpretation of the Act's coverage. Id.
Kozar v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. 320 F, Supp. 335, 366 (W.D. Mich. 1970) (construing Federal
Employer's Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 5 i et seq.).
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went with the Kozar and Sweet holdings focuses on whether Congress intended the word
"injury" in the statute to encompass pre-impact claims, and not whether these claims are
compatible with the jurisdiction's approach to mental distress.
V. A NEW APPROACH
Much of the difficulty and confusion evident in many pre-impact distress decisions
sterns from judicial insistence that the plaintiff bring the cause of action within the
confines of that jurisdiction's rules governing claims for negligently inflicted emotional
distress."" Unfortunately, the courts tend to adhere to these arbitrary and worn out
rules, originally developed to discourage fraudulent claims, to protect the defendant
from unlimited liability and to prevent a "flood of litigation." 351 Accordingly, courts have
failed to address whether such historically valid policy considerations are in fact advanced
by their application to claims for pre-impact distress.
No claim for pre-impact distress suffered by a victim who is injured or dies as a
result of the occurrence of the feared event should be subject to these rules. Rather, so
long as the plaintiff can establish to the satisfaction of the fact-finder that he or she
experienced distress, courts should allow recovery. Worries about fraud, burdensome
litigation, and potentially unlimited liability for the defendant can be abated by applying
the approach suggested in this Article rather than denying recovery for such distress.
This Article suggests an approach to the problems of pre-impact distress claims
which recognizes that some circumstances virtually ensure the claim's genuineness. When
the defendant negligently places a victim in danger of serious physical harm or death,
and injury or death does in fact occur as a result of the feared event, courts should allow
recovery for pre-impact distress without requiring proof of preceding impact or resulting
physical manifestations. This approach is viable for-all jurisdictions which have not yet
developed a cause of action for pre-impact distress. This approach also addresses the
concerns which motivated courts' past reluctance to extend protection to a plaintiff's
mental health: increased litigation, potentially unlimited liability for the defendant, and
fear of spurious claims. The need to protect courts from burdensome litigation, as a
reason for denying recognition to a meritorious claim, has been soundly discredited. 352
Claims for pre-impact distress would not increase the number of lawsuits because a
plaintiff would simply append, however, the pre-impact distress claim to the action the
plaintiff already has against the defendant for injury or death caused by defendant's
negligence.
350 The Southern District of New York, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, and the Texas Court of Civil Appeals have attempted to allow recovery for such damages
under the theory of pain and suffering. Most courts and commentators have recognized and
maintained a distinction between damages for emotional distress and those for pain and suffering
which arise from physical injury. See supra note 11. The attempts by these courts to bring pre-
impact emotional distress claims within an all encompassing definition of pain and suffering may
well avoid the problems of fitting such a claim within the jurisdiction's usual approach to claims of
negligently inflicted emotional distress. It does not, however, make the analysis correct. See supra
notes 250-65 and 216-36 and accompanying text.
35I See supra text at notes 34-38.
"2 See e.g., Falzone v. Busch, 45 N.J. 559, 214 A.2d 12 (1965) ("the fear of an expansion of
litigation should not deter courts from granting relief in meritorious cases"); PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 8, § 54, at 361 (it is the court's business to make precedent if a wrong requires redress,
regardless of increase in lawsuits).
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This approach properly limits defendant liability because it imposes no additional
duty to conform one's conduct to avoid a negligence judgment. Rather, this approach is
based on a duty already recognized by all jurisdictions: the duty to avoid exposing
another to an unreasonable risk of serious bodily injury or death. Therefore, this
approach is not as far-reaching as that recently embraced by courts in Hawaii, California,
and elsewhere which, in addition to abolishing the physical injury requirement, further
imposed a duty on the defendant to avoid creating risks of inflicting mental distress
upon a victim. This limit on defendant's duty thus should assuage concerns about
disproportionate liability.
Finally, this approach addresses judicial concerns that plaintiffs can too easily fake
claims for mental distress. The rule would apply only where the negligence victim actually
apprehends the event causing the distress and is injured or dies when the event occurs.
This approach is warranted by the circumstances — the fact that the event which caused
the distress does occur establishes the genuineness of the victim's stress. The "guarantee
of genuineness" test is at least as applicable to this type of pre-impact distress as it is to
corpse mishandling and inaccurate telegram cases.353
 These pre-impact cases share with
the previously recognized exceptions "an especial likelihood" of genuine and serious
mental distress354 making it unfair to require the plaintiff to establish additional proof
of the merits of his or her claim.
When the plaintiff fortuitously avoids the event which caused the distress, courts
are free to apply their existing rules concerning claims for mental distress. Stich a
distinction between pre-impact claims is merited. First, it may be that, despite a plaintiff's
fears for his physical safety, the defendant's acts or omissions did not, in fact, expoSe
the plaintiff to an unreasonable risk of physical harm. 355 Under the suggested rule, the
defendant could not be liable as he or she breached no recognized duty. In other
instances, the defendant may have exposed the plaintiff only to a risk of emotional
distress, conduct which most courts and this approach do not label as negligent. 35 G
Furthermore, even if the defendant negligently exposed the plaintiff to a risk of physical
harm the fact that the harm did not occur affects the genuineness of the claim. Where
the harm is avoided, the genuineness of the claim, if tested by the circumstances giving
rise to the distress, will depend upon the immediacy of the threat to plaintiff's security.
These "avoided impact" cases, then, are not susceptible to a general rule which posits
the existence of a guarantee of genuineness in the circumstances.
Where the defendant's conduct threatens the victim with serious physical harm or
death, the arbitrary rules developed to discourage spurious or fraudulent claims are
thus unnecessary. In zone-of-danger jurisdictiOns, it is unnecessary to require that phys-
ical symptoms result from the mental distress, because the death or injury of the victim
demonstrates the validity of the claim for distress. This approach would eliminate the
necessity of time consuming argument over whether elevated blood pressure or pulse
rate is a sufficient physical consequence to allow recovery as a physical manifestation. 357
'" For a discussion of these exceptions sec supra notes 121-28 and accompanying text.
354 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, at 54.
355 Shatkin v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 727 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1984). The court noted that
planes frequently bank sharply to one side. Id. at 207. Thus, while a passenger on board may
experience emotional distress due to the sudden movement, he or she may not, in fact, be at any
risk.
356 Compare supra notes 31-140 with notes 141-56 and accompanying text.
353
 See supra text at note 197.
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It does leave the courts free, however, to conclude that in particular cases the circum-
stances giving rise to the emotional distress merit an exception to the jurisdiction's general
approach to emotional distress claims." 8 Moreover, jurisdictions which continue to follow
the impact rule as a method of distinguishing between valid and spurious claims will not
have to determine whether the impact preceded the mental injury. While it appears that
the Solomon v. Warren" decision was correct in finding that the fact of impact, not its
timing, is controlling, some jurisdictions may persist in requiring an impact-distress
sequence. This Article's approach will prevent absurd decisions in which courts strain to
find some evidence of impact. Otherwise, plaintiffs will argue that the victim suffered
slight impact, perhaps from a flying plate or magazine when a crashing plane began to
roll, and therefore should be able to recover for mental stress although the impact was
totally unrelated to the distress.""
This Article does not address the issue of proof,"' certainly an issue of major
concern when the victim — the best witness as to the existence and extent of pre-impact
distress — is unavailable. 882 Nevertheless, the suggested approach does not in any way
shift or lessen a plaintiff's burden of proving the existence of the damage claimed. Issues
of proof obviously will generate controversy. When circumstances show, however, that a
plaintiff was clearly aware of his or her impending death, courts should not summarily
dismiss the claim merely because of the estate's inability to establish that the plaintiff
endured a preceding impact or suffered resulting physical consequences prior to death.
The Challenger accident presents an especially compelling scenario for recognizing
a right to recover for pre-impact distress. One can only guess at the tremendous fear
which some members of the crew experienced, however fleetingly, as they realized that
something terribly wrong had happened to the craft. In a case like this, it is simply
unnecessary to require that the plaintiffs establish either physical injuries or prior impact
to ensure the genuineness of their claims.
V I.  CONCLUSION
Courts have recognized claims for mental distress reluctantly. While the courts were
initially uniform in denying all recovery, progressive courts later began to recognize
mental health deserved legal protection, first against intentional invasions, 888 and then
against negligent ones. 584 But concerns about unlimited litigation, unlimited liability, and
fraudulent claims caused courts to require that the plaintiff prove elements in addition
35' See discussion of Quell, 361 N.W.2d 438, supra at note 132-40.
35 ' 540 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1976).
36° It is true that this Article's suggested approach, which would allow recovery for emotional
distress suffered prior to impact by a decedent, will result in denying recovery to plaintiffs who
experience the same mental fear and anguish yet. are fortuitously spared impact. It has already
been noted, however, that the impact rule excludes many genuine claims. The suggested approach,
while not solving the dilemma, at least potentially broadens the number of valid claims for which
there can be recovery.
561 For a discussion of one author's comments concerning problems of proving the existence
of pre-impact distress, see supra note 164.
362 For a discussion of cases in which questions concerning proof of emotional distress have
been raised, see supra notes 172-75,190-97,264-65 and accompanying text.
363 See supra notes 98-59 and accompanying text.
964 See supra notes 60-161 and accompanying text.
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to negligence and resulting distress. 365 Only recently have a few jurisdictions repudiated
these approaches in favor of recognizing a cause of action for negligently inflicted
foreseeable serious emotional distress. 366
Pre-impact distress is mental distress caused by the victim's appreciation that defen-
dant's negligence has placed him or her at risk of harm. Some courts have considered
claims for pre-impact distress as other than merely claims for mental distress. 367 Most
courts that have considered claims for pre-impact distress, however, have required the
plaintiff to fit the action within the jurisdiction's rules for claims of mental distress
generally.368 In so doing, courts have failed to consider whether the reasons underlying
the traditional rules are furthered by requiring that claims for pre-impact distress fit
within such bounds.
This Article,suggests that where a defendant has negligently exposed a victim to a
risk of injury or death, and injury or death actually occurs, courts should allow recovery
for the victim's mental distress without reference to traditional rules so long as the
plaintiff can prove that the victim apprehended his or her peril prior to the event. Such
an approach adequately protects against burdensome litigation and unlimited liability
for a defendant, yet recognizes that the guarantee of genuineness inherent in the facts
giving rise to the claim makes other tests for distinguishing between meritorious and
spurious claims unnecessary.
3" See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
366 See supra notes 141-56 and accompanying text.
367 See supra notes 214-36 and 248-265 accompanying text.
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